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ABSTRACT 
 
The necessity of verifying user identity is a crucial element of any system to avoid potential 
identity attacks. Selecting an appropriate verification method impacts on the system’s overall 
behaviour since it is a trade-off between security and usability. It is even more significant when 
that system is situated in a pervasive environment since this type of environment is more 
vulnerable to such attacks. Any proposed method for this environment needs to be seamless (non-
intrusive) and secure. As users in such environments tend to access a variety of resources across 
multiple networking domains, verifying their identity in a secure way requires a real-time 
verification method. Therefore, a seamless verification process with a reliable level of security is 
required.  
Most existing methods of user identity verification are obtrusive, as they are not devised to work 
within a pervasive computing environment. This obtrusiveness is particularly germane when the 
main system uses more than one method in the verification process to enhance system security. 
Most existing solutions are either unaware of the context of the user, or context-aware but rely on 
part of the context. The context (current status) of a user can be determined through some 
primitives such as time and location, which are interpreted in a meaningful user context such as 
role or privilege.  
This research proposes a new approach for user identity verification, called Context-Aware 
Identity Verification (CAIV) which uses multiple context parameters to increase the reliability of 
the verification process, yet does not rely on obtrusive methods such as biometrics like iris and 
facial recognition. It uses fuzzy logic reasoning to infer the identity of the user from knowledge 
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about the user’s context. The rules of the fuzzy system were derived by extracting experts’ opinions 
and casting that knowledge into a fuzzy inference engine. The inference engine makes the system 
capable of taking decisions in a similar way to that of experienced security personnel. The output 
of the inference engine is a trust value which reflects how much trust the system has in the claimed 
identity of the user. Thus, the system interprets the current context of the user into a trust value 
which eventually enables the system to determine the trustworthiness of the claimed identity. 
Results obtained from extensive testing of the implemented system on the designated simulator 
show that the proposed approach as a primary method for user identity verification in pervasive 
computing environments maintains satisfactory rates in specificity, sensitivity and accuracy. It 
maintains two aspects: security and seamless access to secured resources in pervasive computing 
environments.  
Moreover, the proposed approach guarantees that any compromised user credential information 
will not threaten the user’s security and privacy in other domains. This kind of threat happens when 
a user’s credentials are stolen by an intruder, which may give the intruder the ability to use them 
in other domains. In CAIV situation, these parameters are extracted from contextual information 
of the system environment; hence, the data breach affects only the CAIV domain without 
compromising other domains.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The proliferation of smart things over the last decade has brought a mature smart environment to 
the fore. The smart environment (a pervasive computing environment) has different characteristics 
and challenges that make it more vulnerable than a traditional computing environment.  
Context-awareness is one pervasive computing characteristic. It emerges as a key area of research 
in pervasive computing. Context-aware systems can adapt their operations to the current context 
of the user without explicit user intervention and thus can increase usability and effectiveness by 
taking environmental context into account (Baldauf, 2007). Context-aware solutions can be used 
in different aspects of our life, e.g. healthcare, industry, tourism, education and others. However, 
pervasive computing has both challenges and opportunities.  
One of the challenges in the pervasive computing environment is security and privacy (Conti et 
al., 2012). Generally, security is represented by confidentiality, integrity and availability, often 
called a CIA-triad. The CIA-triad is important in every secure activity within this environment. 
Confidentiality is an essential CIA-triad goal which need to be preserved in the pervasive 
environment. Consequently, that goal is embodied by verifying the user’s identity. There are three 
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main authentication methods to verify user’s identity. In this thesis, HAK is used as an abbreviation 
of those three most common authentication methods, namely, something you Have, something you 
Are, and something you Know. Verification achieved by traditional HAK methods have many 
drawbacks in term of usability, latency, complexity, security and privacy; therefore, there is a need 
to devise a new method which is tailored and designed to the pervasive environment, which is one 
of the motivations behind our proposal.  
1.2 Research Problem  
Some researchers have employed pervasive computing features to solve security issues, 
while others have highlighted the challenges and opportunities in pervasive computing 
environments. First, Al-Karkhi, Al-Yasiri and Linge (2015) developed an approach (known as 
NIAS) to infer the user’s identity by monitoring their behaviour while interacting with the 
environment. However, the NIAS approach assumes that a user performs recurrent activities on a 
daily basis. This assumption leads to a set of rules based on certain parameters (identity, time, 
location). Although NIAS can adapt and learn new rules, it takes a long time to learn new 
behaviour. Second, Emmanouilidis et al. (2013) argued that inferring users’ preferences by 
monitoring their activity while interacting with the smart environment is usually a challenging 
undertaking. Third, Krumm (2009) stated that it is challenging to create security and privacy 
mechanisms that adequately take into consideration the technical as well as the usage challenges 
of ubiquitous computing systems. Finally, Chalmers (2011) claimed that, “By predicting the future 
we can take less frequent readings, perform less processing of data and, probably, more 
importantly, we can avoid communicating new readings so frequently.” 
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Da Rocha & Endler (2012) and Chen & Kotz (2000) argued that location is the most dominant 
context in use while others are rarely used. “Only location-aware applications have been widely 
deployed, producing some commercial products” (Da Rocha and Endler, 2012). Covington et al. 
(2002) stated that “We can no longer assume that user “sessions” will persist for extended periods 
with the same authentication and authorization credentials”. 
For the reasons above, a new unobtrusive and non-distractive real time verification method of user 
identity is required for such a dynamic and challenging environment. The new method has 
distinctive features to overcome the current challenges with existing approaches. It needs to 
maintain the available context to determine whether a particular activity is performed by a trusted 
user or an intruder. It will be argued that user context can be used to ascertain a level of trust of 
that user activity. Furthermore, Li, Martínez and Rubio (2017) described the benefit of maintaining 
the available context as the key to achieve context awareness. 
Current verification methods are vulnerable. For instance, biometrics such as face and fingerprint 
recognition are regarded as a robust identity verification method but they are susceptible to a 
spoofing attack. Samples can be gathered from their data sources, for instance, by capturing a 
facial image for facial recognition or by lifting a fingerprint (Akhtar, Micheloni and Foresti, 2015).  
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1.3 Research Motivation  
Identity verification in a pervasive computing environment needs to change in terms of security 
and usability. The ubiquitous computing environment contains implicit data about users (context). 
These data can be used to enhance real-time identity verification. Campbell et al. (2003) stated 
that “Often, traditional security is somewhat static and context insensitive” and that “Security 
services should make extensive use of context information available. Context data can provide 
valuable information for intrusion detection mechanisms”. Added to this, Schumacher (2012) 
stated that “in the context of security, the focus has moved from the question who you are towards 
how you are”; he declared that it is suspicious behaviour which matters rather than the identity 
itself. We believe that behaviour can be inferred from the context. The aim of this research is to 
present a new method of verifying a user’s identity. Context-Aware Identity Verification (CAIV) 
approach, which employs context parameters of pervasive computing environment in a user’s 
identity verification process. The CAIV method is a context-based approach to infer a user’s 
identity. The inferred result is based on the available context; consequently, the system can verify 
the claimed identity of the user. 
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1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
This research aims to develop a new verification method of user identity which relies on multi-
context parameters. The method guarantees a seamless verification process. Added to this, there 
are five specific objectives which are illustrated below: 
i. To understand context parameters of pervasive computing environment and discover the 
association between them and the user identity. 
ii. To propose a new method that relies on multi-context parameters to verify a user’s identity. 
iii. To speed up the verification process by reducing the lengthy initial learning process by 
relying on a proper reasoning method.  
iv. To build a simulator mimicking real scenarios of the system to test and evaluate the 
performance of the CAIV method.  
v. To build a prototype of the CAIV method and integrate it with an information system.  
The proposed method will benefit the user by allowing them to focus on high-level activities 
without having to interrupt what they are doing every time they wish to access a secure facility 
within the domain. Furthermore, it improves the system’s performance by reducing the initial 
learning process needed which is one of the limitations of previous approaches.  
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1.5 Research Questions 
In the conducted research, two key questions are addressed which are illustrated below: 
i. What are the relevant context parameters that we can use to verify a user’s identity? 
ii. What is the best reasoning method to predict a user’s identity by using these parameters?  
1.6 Research Methodology 
Research has more than one definition and different types. Research interoperates with logic which 
is part of a scientific method. The research type can be selected according to the research 
environment.  
Ostle & Mensing (1975) define research as “An inquiry into the nature of, the reasons for, and the 
consequences of any particular set of circumstances, whether these conditions are experimentally 
controlled or recorded just as they occur”. Added to that, it implies those researchers who are 
interested in the repeatability of the results and their extension to more general and complicated 
scenarios, while Kothari (2004) defines research as a scientific investigation art which leads to 
adding an original contribution to existing knowledge. This investigation is going to be achieved 
by researchers. Kothari stated that the duty of researchers is to find the problem and formulate it 
to be susceptible to research. That problem (the research problem) needs to be solved in a 
systematic way which is called a research methodology.  
Kothari (2004) classified research types into five pairs. Descriptive versus analytical, applied 
versus fundamental, qualitative versus quantitative, conceptual versus empirical.  
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“Scientific method attempts to achieve this ideal by experimentation, observation, logical 
arguments from accepted postulates and a combination of these three in varying proportions.” 
(Ostle and Mensing, 1975). Logic plays a significant role in formulating propositions explicitly 
and accurately in the scientific method. The purpose of experimentation is to test the hypotheses 
and find if there is a new relationship among variables if existed (Kothari, 2004).  
Hence, the research involves the testing of the precision of CAIV against different situations. 
Therefore, the adopted research methodology is based on empirical research and the scientific 
method. Empirical research relies on experience or observation; the research conclusions are based 
on data which are capable of being verified by observation or experiment.  
 The following steps describe the research methodology process according to the adopted 
methodology:  
i. Identify the research problem by relying on the state of the art.  
ii. Perform a literature review of previous studies.  
iii. Review some related work to specify the most significant parameters of the context. Then 
select those parameters to be applied as an input to the system.  
iv. Define research objectives.  
v. Find an inference method that complies with the research objectives.  
vi. Develop a framework based on the selected inference method in step v.  
vii. Design and build the framework simulator and generate a dataset. 
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viii. Evaluate the developed system which is built according to the proposed framework.  
Figure 1.1 shows the CAIV research process. It illustrates the steps required to define the problem, 
formulate the solution, design, test and interpret the results.  
 
Figure 1.1: Research Process Flow Chart 
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1.7 Thesis Layout  
The thesis is organised as follows.  
➢ Chapter One gives an introductory description of my approach performance and goals as 
well as challenges and limitations. Furthermore, research objectives and questions are 
enumerated.  
➢ Chapter Two explores the literature review and lists some related work. This includes 
identity, authentication factors, fuzzy logic and context-awareness. It discussed the reason 
behind using fuzzy logic and how this makes the solution more elastic.  
➢ Chapter Three presents an analytical model of the system.  
➢ Chapter Four gives an overview of the CAIV elements, architecture, scenarios and 
prediction method selection.  
➢ Chapter Five reviews the dataset description and design, the simulator design and 
implementation and the CAIV prototype.  
➢ Chapter Six presents the system’s dataset generation, experiments implementation, 
threshold selection and a discussion of the result.  
➢ Chapter Seven summarises the findings of the proposed method and suggests some 
possible directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2  
Review of Digital Identity and 
Context-Awareness 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Identity is a significant element of the user’s interaction in the digital world that allows the 
system to recognise the user, which helps the system to deal with every individual in the proper 
way. Identity is moved from a physical into a digital representation and is used everywhere in the 
digital environment to identify that user. Identity needs to be verified to confirm the authenticity 
of the user’s identity. Identity is regarded as a crucial aspect in the digital environment. Any breach 
of identity (e.g. identity theft) affects both the user and the environment. The vulnerability to 
identity attack is increased depending on the computing environment type which can be traditional, 
cloud or pervasive computing. The pervasive computing environment brings new challenges to 
identity verification since it does not have a fixed location or a single domain. A traditional 
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computing environment device such as a desktop computer is situated in a fixed location and 
belongs to a certain domain while a pervasive computing device, for example, a tablet, may be 
used in different locations and across multiple domains. Moving the user within a smart 
environment makes the system request the user’s identity verification every time the user wishes 
to access a secure facility.  
The process of verifying a user’s identity in a pervasive computing environment is a real-time 
identity verification. It requires an instant response to the user’s request and at the same time 
protects the user from any identity attack. This means that any proposed solution encounters a 
trade-off between security and usability, which remains an open issue. Context-awareness is an 
approach that is used to facilitate the interaction between the user and the system. There is a 
potential benefit of using it in the identity verification process.  
2.2 Pervasive Computing  
The world has witnessed a revolutionary development in the computing realm. The technological 
transformation from traditional to pervasive computing, from a huge device (mainframe computer) 
to a very tiny device (smart dust), affects computing environment characteristics dramatically. 
Krumm (2009) classified pervasive computing as the third era of computing, characterised by 
small and portable devices (smartphones, PDAs, embedded computers) of which a person may 
own many. The second era (the PC era) was when one person owned a personal computer used by 
this individual only. The first era (the mainframe computer era) was represented by a single large 
computer, belonging to an organisation and shared by many individuals simultaneously. The third 
era has raised a few challenges and opportunities within its environment, when different variables 
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are surrounding the device and these variables change over time. For instance, devices move 
among various domains within a specific environment and need to interact with the system’s 
environments in these domains. There are different definitions, synonyms, challenges and 
opportunities within a pervasive computing environment.  
Pervasive computing is also described as ubiquitous computing (ubicomp), ambient intelligence, 
everywhere (Greenfield, 2010), physical computing, the internet of things (IoT) or haptic 
computing. Each term asserts a specific aspect; however, they share common aspects such as 
portability, connectivity, usability and adaptability. 
Weiser (1991) defined pervasive computing as “The most profound technologies are those that 
disappear. They weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable 
from it”. Moreover, he described pervasive computing as invisible computing and calm 
technology.  
Reddy (2006) stated that for the promise of pervasive computing to materialise fully, technology 
and support structures need to advance along four directions: computing, communication, 
cognition and collaboration - the 4Cs of pervasive computing. It is not difficult to speculate how 
the world of tomorrow will be as we make steady progress on the 4Cs and the resulting advances 
in pervasive computing. The progress affects several aspects such as knowledge workers, 
intelligent transportation, pervasive healthcare and context-aware appliances and enterprises. 
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2.3 Related Work 
The state of the art shows different approaches which have used context-awareness in various areas 
such as healthcare, daily activity, security, etc. These approaches use different parameters from the 
context to facilitate the interaction between the user and the systems in the pervasive environment 
and make that interaction seamless. Furthermore, there are several security approaches that also 
use context to enhance the identity verification process.  
Jia et al. (2014) proposed to adjust the authentication configuration of the user according to the 
context, and they stated that it is a trade-off between security and convenience while the user is in 
different contexts.  
Maintaining limited parameters is another issue in using context-awareness in security. Nishiki & 
Tanaka (2005) used two parameters from context: user location and profiles. Jang et al. (2010) 
used context in security by proposing context-awareness role-based access control (RBAC); 
however, they relied on the user’s profile and environment, and they tended to infer the service 
rather than the identity. Other approaches have a limited scope, such as that used by Kim & Lee 
(2006) that used context-awareness in security but it was limited to the home domain.  
There are two aspects related to the previous solutions, which are the interaction type and the 
environment. The CAIV method maintains Human to Machine(H2M) interactions while there are 
two approaches in which they used Machine to Machine (M2M) or (Human to Human) H2H 
interactions. Choi et al. (2013) used context-awareness in healthcare services but they rely on 
M2M interaction, and Malek et al. (2008) utilised a context-aware concept to make users customise 
their preferences and rules to authenticate other members (H2H interaction). Regarding computing 
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scope, the CAIV framework will be applied in ubiquitous computing, while there is an approach 
by Hayashi et al. (2013) in which they used context-awareness to make authentication scalable in 
a mobile computing environment.  
2.4 Identity  
There are different definitions of identity in the literature. Deng (2011) defined identity as “the 
way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, religion, language, and culture” while Taylor (1989) has another definition: “my identity 
is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within 
which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, 
or what I endorse or oppose”. From the two definitions above, it can be concluded that identity 
can be a claim of owning a facility or it might be the responsibility’s boundaries which embody 
the person’s identity. Also, Rundle et al. (2007) defined identity as “a limited notion of a set of 
claims”, which supports the Deng definition. However, Bishop (2002) stated that identity covers a 
wider range of subjects, not just people. Subjects of identities can be software agents (e.g. Web 
services and user client software) and hardware devices (e.g. PCs, mobile phones and network 
equipment).  
Similarly, (Chisholm, 1997; Fearon, 1999) described identity as the sameness of an object 
anywhere and anytime. In addition, the Fearon context approach represents the current scenario in 
the digital environment, for instance, when a person has two different roles at the same university. 
On one hand, he or she is a student who can access their course class by using their student ID, yet 
on the other hand, s/he is a lecturer and can access the staff lobby by using their staff ID. 
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Rountree (2012) classified identity into two types: physical identity and digital identity. Rountree 
has a definition of identity in general: “your identity is the set of characteristics that make you who 
you are”. He believed that physical identity and digital identity are not similar; however, they are 
conceptually the same. The difference between them is that it is easy to hide the characteristics of 
digital identity from a potential attacker, which is the opposite of physical identity. Additionally, 
he stated that trust is a vital factor in identity verification.  
“An identity of an individual person may comprise many partial identities of which each represents 
the person in a specific context or role. A partial identity is a subset of attribute values of a complete 
identity, where a complete identity is the union of all attribute values of all identities of this person” 
(Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010). They argue that identity (combined identity) represents the 
combination of different attributes from specific context and it is not a single attribute. A combined 
identity represents the comprehensive identifier of the user. This identity is a real representation 
of the user. Added to that, the Identity itself can be an attribute inside other concepts.  
For instance, Al-Karkhi, Al-Yasiri and Linge (2015) included the identity as an attribute of user 
activity as shown in Equation 2-1 below: 
𝑨 = [𝒊𝒅, 𝑳, 𝒕] Equation 2-1 
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2.4.1 Identity Management  
Identity management is an administrative area which is used to maintain digital identity during the 
identity life cycle (creation, modification and revocation). It organises and controls a user’s access 
to the system services and resources. Identity is defined and classified in the identity management 
context in a way that makes it different from other disciplines. 
 Windley (2005) illustrated an identity concept that called tiers of identity. Tier 1 (My Identity) has 
its attributes (traits) derived from the person himself. These attributes make them unique (physical 
and psychological traits). Tier 2 (Shared Identity) attributes are derived from the environment 
which is assigned to a person by a third party to identify them temporarily, e.g. a driver’s licence, 
credit card, health insurance, etc. Tier 3 (Abstracted Identity) deals with the identity of groups and 
with profiling, which is used to track a person or expose them to direct advertising. 
ITU-T (2009) has another classification of identity. They stated that an identity consists of three 
different types of data: identifier, credentials and attributes. 
• Identifiers are a series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify 
a subject. Identifiers can be scoped by time or space or by both. For example, a URI is globally 
unique over time. Pseudonyms can be temporal and efficient only for a specific service. Some 
examples are user account names, passport numbers, mobile phone numbers, employee numbers, 
pseudonyms and URI. 
• Credentials are a set of data providing evidence for claims about parts of or an entire identity. 
For example, passwords, digital certificates, fingerprints, Kerberos tickets (Neuman and Ts’o, 
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1994) and SAML assertions (Hughes and Maler, 2005). Establishing a claim can be based on one 
or more credentials. 
• Attributes are a set of data that describe the characteristics of a subject. The data include 
fundamental information for identifying a subject (e.g. full name, domicile and date of birth), 
his/her preferences and information generated based on his/her activities. Some examples include 
family names, domiciles, ages, genders, roles, titles, affiliations, activity records and reputation. 
2.5 Authentication Factors 
The process of verifying a user’s identity is called electronic authentication (e-authentication) or 
authentication. This process can be performed through different approaches. These approaches are 
called factors which are used to verify a user’s identity. Presently, there are three authentication 
factors (HAK methods). However, they are named differently. Cristofaro (2014) named 
authentication factors as 1) knowledge, something the user knows, e.g. a password; 2) possession, 
something the user has, e.g. a security token (also called a hardware token); 3) inherence, 
something the user is, e.g. a biometric characteristic, while the State Service Commission of New 
Zealand defined these factors as something you know, something you have or something you are 
(Commission, 2006).  
There are three authentication approaches to combine this three-factor identity verification. First, 
the user can use only one factor for authentication which is called single factor authentication, 
second, user identity can be verified by using two factors which is called two-factor authentication, 
and, finally, to enhance the security of authentication, more than two factors can be utilised which 
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is called multi-factor authentication. The next three sections illustrate the three authentication 
factors.  
2.5.1 Knowledge (something you know) 
Knowledge-based authentication relies on a shared secret between the system and the validating 
user (Chun-Li, Hung-Min and Hwang, 2001). This secret can be generated by the user or by the 
system. Knowledge-based authentication has four categories: password (phrase), passcode, pattern 
recognition and challenge question. The password is the most common category (Cranor and 
Garfinkel, 2008). A password is less costly and is easy to use and maintain. However, it is 
vulnerable to replay attacks, shoulder surfing, password theft, etc. One of the reasons passwords 
became the dominant method of authentication in early computer systems is because of the 
accessibility they afforded to users (Morris and Thompson, 1979). It is classified as a well known 
method, because it is more usable than other methods. 
 
2.5.2 Possession (something you have) 
Possession is a physical device (an object) possessed by the user. It helps the user to prove their 
identity without the burden of having to remember the secret key which is already stored on the 
user’s device and is recognisable by the system. The physical device can be a bankcard, key fob 
or smart card (O’Gorman, 2003). It can be an active device by adding the facility to generate a 
one-time passcode (Weiss, 1988). A passcode is like a password except it is generally longer and 
more sophisticated and is generated or stored on a device. 
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2.5.3 Inherence (something you are) 
Inherence authentication factors are unique physical traits of the user such as iris, fingerprint, voice 
or face recognition or vein patterns; this is called biometrics or biometry. Biometrics have two 
subcategories: traditional biometrics and behavioural biometrics. Traditionally, biometrics rely on 
physical traits while behavioural biometrics rely on a behaviour trait that is acquired over time 
versus physiological characteristics or a physical trait (Schumacher, 2012). It is possible to breach 
both of them. However, the available technology makes traditional biometrics more vulnerable to 
biometric spoofing.  
Added to this, two other approaches have proposed a fourth authentication factor but they have 
not yet been approved. Brainard et al. (2006) claimed to add somebody you know as a fourth 
authentication factor and Choi and Zage (2012) claimed to add the location of the user, “where 
you are,” as a new authentication factor. 
2.6 Context-Awareness  
Context-awareness is a technology which makes the actor (user, device) adapt, interact or link with 
the environment or with each other in an unobtrusive way without distracting the user during 
sophisticated operations. There are different definitions of the context and context-awareness in 
the literature. 
2.6.1 Context and Context-Aware 
Brown (1995) defines context as the elements of the user’s environment about which the computer 
knows. Ryan et al. (1998) referred to context as the user’s location, environment, identity and time. 
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Abowd et al. (1999) defined context as “any information that can be used to characterise the 
situation of an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the 
interaction between a user and an application, including the user and application themselves”. 
Dourish (2004) suggested that the notion of context in pervasive computing has a dual origin. First, 
it is a technical notion, figuring out the human action and the relationship between that action and 
the computational platform to support it. Second, it is a social science notion, making analytic 
considerations to certain aspects of social settings. These four definitions of context represent the 
evolution of context definition which is represented by a very general definition by Brown to a 
very specific one by Ryan. However, it can be seen as a comprehensive definition for both Abowd 
and Dourish who give a new definition which conveys a picture of the transformation from 
traditional to ubiquitous computing. There are particular types of context that are, in practice, more 
important than others. These are location, identity, time and activity. The importance of these 
parameters is due to their abilities to characterise the situation of a particular entity (user, device).  
The importance of context is of interest to many areas of software design in computer science, 
especially in the pervasive computing (ubiquitous computing) environment which is exacerbated 
by the new need to keep track of ubiquitous things in the pervasive environment. In this situation 
in which the environment is variable, there is a greater need to understand more about the 
environment. Hence, the most significant concern in pervasive computing research is to anticipate 
the relationship between computation and context (Dourish, 2004). Dourish (2004) reconsiders 
context as an interactional problem rather than a representational problem. He focuses on an 
alternative view of context and discusses some of its implications.  
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Context can be used to adapt the system’s functions according to any change in the context, a 
facility called context-awareness. The first time context-awareness was discussed in 1995 by 
Schilit et al. as software that “adapts according to its location of use, the collection of nearby 
people and objects, as well as changes to those objects over time”(Schilit and York, 1995). Hong 
defined it as follows, “Context-aware systems can provide users with better service based on 
analysing physical context and personal context such as user schedule, user preferences and so on” 
(Hong, Suh and Kim, 2009). Context-awareness is used in this regard to make the adapted systems 
of the concept more usable and user-friendly. Context-awareness has also been described as being 
when “A system is context-aware if it uses context to provide relevant information or services to 
the user; or both of them, where relevancy depends on the user’s task” (Abowd et al., 1999).  
Context-aware applications are becoming more prevalent and can exist in the areas of wearable 
computing, mobile computing, robotics, adaptive and intelligent user interfaces, augmented reality, 
adaptive computing, intelligent environments and context-sensitive interfaces (Krumm, 2009). 
Additionally, context-awareness has become somewhat synonymous with other terms such as 
adaptive (Brown, 1996), situated (Hull, Neaves and Bedford-Roberts, 1997) and environment 
directed (Fickas, Kortuem and Segall, 1997), context sensitive (Rekimoto, Ayatsuka and Hayashi, 
1998). 
According to previous definitions of context-awareness, Krumm (2009) classified context-aware 
computing into two categories: using context and adapting to context.  
The first category has two definitions. The first represents the dynamicity of computing devices 
and how they are affected by sensed and detected context which interpret and respond to the user’s 
 28 
 
devices and the local environment (Hull et al., 1997; Pascoe, 1998; Ryan et al., 1998). The second 
definition uses context to automate a software system, to modify an interface that will maximise 
computing service flexibility (Dey, 1998; Salber et al., 1999).  
The second category is “adapting to context”. It includes context-aware applications which 
dynamically change or adapt their behaviour based on the context of the application and the user 
(Schilit, Theimer and Welch, 1993; Brown, Bovey and Chen, 1997; Ward, Jones and Hopper, 1997; 
Abowd et al., 1998, 1999; Kortuem, Segall and Bauer, 1998; Salber et al., 1999). Ryan et al. (1998) 
define them as applications that monitor input from environmental sensors and allow users to select 
from a range of physical and logical contexts according to their current interests or activities. This 
category is slightly more restrictive than the previous one by identifying the method in which 
applications act upon context. Brown (1998) defines context-aware applications as applications 
that automatically provide information and take action according to the user’s present context as 
detected by sensors. He also adopts a narrow view of context-aware computing by stating that 
these actions can take the form of presenting information to the user, executing a program 
according to context or configuring a graphical layout according to context. 
Jaroucheh et al. (2010) represented context knowledge as the context primitive which represents 
the base context constructs: entity classes, entity attributes, entities associations and rules, as 
shown below in Figure 2.1.  
• Entity class: represents a group of entities (e.g. users, places, devices, etc.) sharing some 
properties.  
• Attribute class: represents entities’ attributes e.g. position, temperature, etc.  
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• Association class: represents a relationship between one entity and either another entity or 
an attribute.  
• Rule class: two types of rule can be identified: (i) Consistency rules provide a mechanism 
for context consistency by specifying conditions that must be held in the context 
information. For example, consistency rules could specify that if the person is cooking, 
s/he must be in the kitchen. (ii) Inference rules are used to generate new context 
information after reasoning on an existing one. For example, an inference rule could 
conclude that a person is sleeping if the light is off and it is night time.  
 
Figure 2.1: Context Primitives (Jaroucheh, Liu and Smith, 2010) 
We conclude that the location and time are very significant elements in both context and identity. 
There are different context parameters they existed in the literature which are relying on location 
and time or one of them, such as user schedule, user preferences, nearby object (user), and user 
profile. These four parameters are going to be considered in the CAIV modelling and design. These 
parameters are linked to the user task (activity) to find how much the system trust that user of a 
specific task (activity).  
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2.6.2 Context-Aware Taxonomy  
There are different taxonomies for context-awareness. These are three core taxonomies: first, a 
taxonomy presented by Schilit & York (1995) which has two orthogonal dimensions: 1- The task 
obtains information or executes a command, 2- The task is executed manually or automatically. 
This taxonomy brings four terms: first, proximate selection applications; information retrieval is 
manual based by the user according to the available context to list-related objects or places which 
are linked to the user to facilitate the user’s choice (preferences). Second, automatic contextual 
configuration, where information retrieval is automated based on available context without user 
intervention; the system creates an automatic binding according to context. Third, contextual 
command applications that execute commands for the user manually based on the context. Finally, 
context-trigger actions, an application that executes commands for the user according to the 
context simply based on if-then rules; if the combination of context exists, the service executes 
automatically.  
The second taxonomy, proposed by Pascoe (1998), deals with context-aware features. The first 
feature is contextual sensing and is the ability to detect contextual information and present it to the 
user, augmenting the user’s sensory system. The next feature is contextual adaptation and is the 
capacity to execute or modify a service automatically based on the current context. The third 
feature, contextual resource discovery, allows context-aware applications to locate and exploit 
resources and services that are relevant to the user’s context; this is mapped directly to automatic 
contextual reconfiguration. The final feature, contextual augmentation, is the ability to associate 
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digital data with the user’s context. A user can view the data when they are in that associated 
context.  
The third taxonomy is presented by Abowd et al. (1999), whereby they combine the ideas of the 
two approaches above and take into account the three major differences. Similar to Pascoe’s 
taxonomy, it is a list of context-aware features that context-aware applications may support. There 
are three categories: 
1. Presentation of information and services to a user 
2. Automatic execution of a service 
3. Tagging of context to information for later retrieval 
Abowd et al. (1999) claimed that their taxonomy has two benefits; the first is that it further 
specifies the types of application for which the researchers provide support. The second benefit is 
that it describes the types of feature that developers should be thinking about when building 
context-aware applications. 
The three taxonomies show different views of how to use information from context and present 
systematic methods. They aggregate data, interpret them and take action or store these data to be 
retrieved later.  
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2.6.3 Context Acquisition (Sensing) 
Chen (2004) presents three different approaches of how to acquire contextual information: 
(1) Direct sensor access. The client software gathers the sensed information from a local  
built-in device. 
(2)  Middleware infrastructure. It uses encapsulation methods by introducing a layered 
architecture to context-aware systems with the intention of hiding low-level sensing details. 
(3) Context server. The next logical step is to permit multiple clients to access remote data 
sources.  
Indulska & Sutton (2003) classified sensors into three groups: 
• Physical sensors: the most frequently used types of sensor are physical sensors. Many hardware 
sensors are available today which are capable of capturing almost any physical data. Table 2-1 
shows some examples of physical sensors (Schmidt and Van Laerhoven, 2001).  
• Virtual sensors: these source context data from software applications or services. For example, 
physical location can be sensed by an electronic calendar, emails, etc. Other context attributes can 
be user activity such as mouse movement and keyboard input. 
• Logical sensors: these sensors make use of several information sources and combine physical 
and virtual sensors with additional information from databases or various other sources to solve 
higher tasks.  
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Table 2-1: Commonly Used Physical Sensor Types 
Type of Context Available sensors  
Light Photodiodes, colour sensors, IR and UV- 
sensors etc. 
Visual context Various cameras 
Audio Microphones 
Motion, acceleration Mercury switches, angular sensors, 
accelerometers, motion detectors, magnetic fields 
Location Outdoor: Global Positioning System (GPS), 
Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM); Indoor: Active Badge system. etc. 
Touch Touch sensors implemented in mobile devices 
Temperature Thermometers 
Physical attributes Biosensors to measure skin resistance, blood 
pressure 
 
Chen & Kotz (2000) describe four sensing mechanisms: location, low-level context beyond 
location, high levels of context and context changes.  
2.6.4 Context Interpreting 
Context-aware systems take data as input and then determine how to adapt or respond to these 
data. Context inferencing is the act of making sense of these input data from sensors and other 
sources, to determine or infer the user’s situation. Once the user’s situation has been inferred, the 
application can take an appropriate action. The sensed input is often not enough to infer the 
situation appropriately so this brings up additional issues such as how to resolve ambiguity or 
uncertainty in context, and the role of rules and machine learning (Krumm, 2009).  
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Krumm makes a comparison between rules and machine learning which can be used to overbalance 
of rules. Context-aware applications are most commonly designed from a set of if-then rules, such 
as:  
 
       IF the application senses a particular situation, THEN it should perform a particular action. 
 
Rules are easy to create because all the knowledge for each rule is represented in a homogeneous 
format and rule-based systems are relatively easy to build because there is a large number of 
existing rules engines that determine when a rule has been satisfied. Rules are also relatively 
intuitive and are thus easy to work with (Krumm, 2009). 
Additionally, there are some disadvantages of applying machine learning. As it is applied to learn 
the probabilistic relationships between the situation and adaptions, that relationship may be 
difficult to learn, it may require a significant amount of data to learn, it is hard to debug and may 
not be intuitive to the application developer or end user. 
Sometimes it might be necessary to have access to historical context data. Such context histories 
may be used to establish trends and predict future context values. As most data sources constantly 
provide context data, the maintenance of a context history is mainly a memory concern so a 
centralised high-resource storage component is needed. Since in a server-based architecture the 
context data provided by sensors has to be stored at the server-side to offer it to customers, the 
majority of these systems have the facility to query historical context data. Managing historical 
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context data provides the ability to implement intelligent learning algorithms which allow 
provision of highly flexible context-aware services. Furthermore, based on learning algorithms, 
contextual information can be predicted to provide a certain set of services to the user proactively. 
Many of the systems store contextual information, but they all use learning techniques to provide 
context-aware service proactively (Baldauf, 2007). 
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2.7 Summary  
Reviewing the literature on both identity and context-awareness gives us a clear vision of the 
challenges and opportunities of these two correlated fields. Context-awareness relies on context 
and is deployed mainly in pervasive computing. User identity verification is one of the challenges 
in pervasive computing environment because of the environment variances. The pervasive 
environment is different from a traditional computing environment since the user (object, user) is 
moving around and does not have a fixed location. In a traditional computing environment, the PC 
has a fixed location for a month or a year(s), while a smart object can move between locations 
during an hour or a day. The available verification methods of user identity were devised for the 
traditional computing environment and reused in pervasive computing. Using them in the 
pervasive computing environment systems make the system vulnerable to intruder attacks such as 
spoofing.  
Context-awareness has different taxonomies. However, they share a common goal. The unique 
goal is how to make use of the available context and provide the user with a convenient service 
without user intervention. It aggregates data about the user from physical or logical sensors and 
interprets them to trigger an action within the system.  
Context-awareness was used in the early 1990’s for tracking users, as a tourism guide and other 
solutions. It tends to bring a seamless service to the user and made the system less intrusive. It was 
used in a variety of fields such as health, environment, daily activity and security. Security 
approaches have some issues related to context limitations and slowness of the learning process 
due to use of some methods which need sometimes to adapt, such as machine learning.  
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Reviewing the literature highlighted the significance of location and time for both identity and 
context-aware parameters. Four parameters have been chosen from the context to be considered in 
the CAIV modelling and design. The next chapter illustrates the details of the CAIV method 
analytical model. 
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Chapter 3  
CAIV Analytical Model 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The CAIV method aims to verify a user’s identity by measuring the trust level of the user’s activity 
and take a decision upon the current context. It also makes the proposed method more integrative 
with existing systems in the pervasive computing environment and tends to be less intrusive to the 
user. The trust value, which is inferred from the aggregated context of the user, affects the CAIV 
decision. That decision either accepts the claimed identity to identify the user as a legitimate user 
or rejects that claim. Trust has a certain range of values. Modern trust models define trust in terms 
of both the probability and the certainty of a good outcome (Jsang & Ismail, 2002; Paradesi et al., 
2009; Huynh et al., 2006). Since the probability values are between zero and one, the value of the 
trust is between [0,1]. CAIV finds the probability of an activity occurring. Each activity occurs at 
a certain time and location, which is called an event.  
 
 39 
 
Events play a major role in everyday life, organising and depicting the way that the user interacts 
with a certain environment. Laliwala & Chaudhary (2008) refer to the event as an entity that relies 
on two components, which are time and location; Craig and Whitty(2017 defined the event as a 
record of location and time For instance, the calendar events in the user diary have two main 
significant components which are time and location, as shown below in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Event Components 
 
We believe that each component of the event represents a part of the truth; confirming one or both 
of these components by context parameter can affects the truth value positively. The obtained value 
of truth for each context parameter is interpreted as the probability of attending the user at a certain 
(current) location and time. The union of truth values of context parameters is the trust value. The 
trust value represents how far the system is confident that the claimed identity is considered as a 
genuine user identity. The next sections illustrate the trust value extraction and show how this 
value is aggregated, mapped and banded together from each parameter of CAIV model.  
Event 
Location Time 
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3.2 Context Parameters 
The context-aware identity verification (CAIV) method defines four context parameters about a 
particular user which is based on the literature review, known as the user profile. CAIV uses the 
four context parameters, which are user preferences, ambient objects, history log, and calendar 
events in the verification process. The parameters rely on event component(s), as shown in Figure 
3.2, the calendar relies on location and time, while the others rely on the location only. More 
discussion of each of these parameters is provided in the next sections. This profile is then used to 
infer (verify) the user identity from the user’s context, which can represent user behaviour. A user 
behaviour is categorised by a set of activities performed by the user. The verification process is 
based on the process of mapping users’ behaviour to their profile to discover the possibility of 
finding a user at a certain event which is interpreted as a trust value. 
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Figure 3.2: User Profile Dependency  
A user profile defined in terms of the context parameters as described in (3-1) is: 
𝑼𝒄 = [𝑪𝒂𝒍, 𝑨𝒎𝒃, 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇, 𝑯𝒊𝒔𝒕]    3-1 
Where:  𝑈𝑐 – the user profile (context) 
  𝐶𝑎𝑙 – user calendar events 
  𝐴𝑚𝑏 – ambient objects assigned to the user 
  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 – user’s preferences 
  𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 – user’s history log 
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 𝑈: set of registered users. 
𝐿: set of locations. 
Each of the profile elements defined in terms of the location (𝐿), and time (𝑡) where the user 
behaviour (activities) performed. Therefore, we define a function that represents each of these 
parameters as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑙    = 𝑓𝑐(𝐿, 𝑡) 
𝐴𝑚𝑏 = 𝑓𝑎(𝐿, 𝑡) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 = 𝑓𝑝(𝐿, 𝑡) 
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑓ℎ(𝐿, 𝑡) 
Hence (3-1) can be re-written as: 
𝑼𝒄 = 𝒇 (𝑳, 𝒕)                    3-2 
where f is an aggregation of 𝑓𝑝 , 𝑓𝑎, 𝑓ℎ  and 𝑓𝑐 . 
Also, a user behaviour is defined in terms of the activities (A) performed within the pervasive 
environment. An activity defined as a tuple (vector) of user identity, resource location and time 
of accessing the resource as described in Equation 2-1: 
𝑨 = [𝒊𝒅, 𝑳, 𝒕] 
In order to use the user activity to infer the user’s identity, it mapped to the user profile, such 
that: 
𝒊𝒅 = 𝑹𝑴(𝑨, 𝑼𝒄)       3-3 
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3-3 asserts that the user’s identity is a measure of mapping a user’s activity to the user’s profile. 
We call this as the system’s Trust in the user. Therefore 3-3 can be restated as: 
𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕 = 𝑹𝑴(𝑨, 𝑼𝒄)                           3-4 
3-4 represents the basis of CAIV’s verification process. In the next sections, we explain how 
each of the functions 𝑓𝑐, 𝑓𝑎, 𝑓𝑝 and 𝑓ℎ represents the trust value of the corresponding parameter of 
Uc.  
3.2.1 Mapping an Activity to User Preferences 
User Preferences are those locations that the user tends to visit frequently. Each preferred location 
is stored with a description, location and the probability of attending a user in that location. Section 
4.3.1 provides further details about this parameter. The mathematical representation of this 
parameter is as follows:  
Given a user j with an identity 𝑖𝑑𝑗, there is a list of preferences 𝑃𝑟𝑗  such that: 
𝑃𝑟𝑗 = {𝑝𝑟jv ∶ 𝑣 = 1, … , 𝑞𝑗} where 𝑞𝑗is the number of preferences for user j 
Each user preference is represented as a tuple (vector) as follows: 
𝑝𝑟jv = [𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟, 𝑖𝑑𝑗 , 𝑙𝑣, 𝑤𝑝𝑣] 
where 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟 - textual description of 𝑝𝑟jv 
 𝑙𝑣  - the location where 𝑝𝑟jv is associated with that preference 
 𝑤𝑝𝑣 - the user assigned weight to 𝑝𝑟jv, 𝑤𝑝𝑣 ∈ [0,1] 
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As an example, a user id1 registers one preference as swimming with weight 0.5; then this 
preference is stored in the system as: 
𝑝𝑟18 = [′𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔
′, 𝑖𝑑1, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_8, 0.5] 
Now as user j performs an activity (𝑎, 𝑒. 𝑔. 𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑝𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑) as in instance of 𝐴, 
see Equation 2-1, Al-Karkhi, Al-Yasiri and Linge (2015) defined activity as: 
𝑎 = [𝑖𝑑𝑗 , 𝑙𝑎, 𝑡𝑎] 
The system maps activity (𝑎) to each preference in 𝑃𝑟j such that a list of weight values (WP) is 
produced, as follows: 
𝑾𝑷 = {
∀ 𝒑𝒓𝒋𝒗  ∈ 𝑷𝒓𝐣, 𝒘𝒑𝒋𝒗, 𝐢𝐟  𝒍𝒂 =  𝒍𝒗 
 𝟎, 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
         3-5 
Now let 𝑓𝑝𝑟be a function representing the contribution of the preferences context to the trust such 
that: 
𝒇𝒑𝒓 = 𝐦𝐚𝐱(𝑾𝑷)                                           3-6 
3-6 states that the system maps the activity (𝑎) to the preference associated with location 𝑙𝑎 with 
the highest weight value. The weighting values are determined by a trust policy which determines 
the possible values to be given for each 𝑤𝑝𝑣. For instance, during registration, ranked questions 
can be used with rating scale (seldom, occasional, and frequent, which represent the values (0.25, 
0.5, 0.75) respectively as determined by the administrator, for each registered preference. 
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3.2.2 Mapping an Activity to User’s Ambient Objects 
Pervasive computing has smart objects equipped with a communication technology such as 
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, RFID and others. Identifying these objects and link them to the user make the 
system more confident about the user identity. Each object has an identifier (physical, MAC 
address, SN), description, location. The object can be owned by a user, group of users, or a location. 
Section 4.3.3 provides more details about ambient object. The mathematical representation of an 
ambient object is as follows: 
Given a user j with an identity 𝑖𝑑𝑗, there is a list of ambient objects 𝐴𝑂𝑗  such that: 
𝐴𝑂𝑗 = {𝑎𝑜jk ∶ 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑜𝑗} where  𝑜𝑗is the number of ambient objects for user j 
Each ambient object is represented as a tuple (vector) as follows: 
𝑎𝑜jk = [𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟, 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝, 𝑖𝑑𝑗 , 𝑙𝑘] 
where 
         𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟  - is the object identifier if it exists 
          𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟 - textual description of 𝑎𝑜jk 
           𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  -  determines the ownership of the device (whether owned by one user,  
   more than one user, or a location) 
 𝑙𝑘  - the location where 𝑎𝑜jk is associated 
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𝑤𝑎𝑘 = 𝑓(𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) = {
𝑤𝑚               𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 = ′𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟′ 
𝑤𝑙                       𝑖𝑓  𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 = ′𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛′
𝑤𝑢                                  𝑖𝑓  𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 = ′𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟′
  
Where  
 𝑤𝑎𝑘 - 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, 𝑤𝑎𝑘 ∈ [0,1] 
Now as user j performs an activity (𝑎) as in instance of 𝐴, see Equation 2-1: 
𝑎 = [𝑖𝑑𝑗 , 𝑙𝑎, 𝑡𝑎] 
The system maps activity (𝑎) to each ambient object in 𝐴𝑂j such that a list of weight values 
(WA) is produced, as follows: 
𝑾𝑨 = {
∀ 𝒂𝒐𝒋𝒌  ∈ 𝑨𝑶𝐣, 𝒘𝒂𝒌, 𝐢𝐟  𝒍𝒂 =  𝒍𝒌 𝒐𝒓  𝒊𝒅𝒂 =  𝒊𝒅𝒌 
 𝟎,                          𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
    
where 𝒍𝒂the location of activity(𝒂)                         3-7 
Now let 𝑓𝑎be a function representing the contribution of the ambient object context to the trust 
such that: 
𝒇𝒂 = 𝐦𝐚𝐱(𝑾𝑨)                                                                              3-8 
3-8 states that the system maps the activity (𝑎) to the ambient object associated with location 𝑙𝑎 
with the highest weight value. The weighting values are determined by trust criteria which are 
based on experts’ opinion to determine the possible values to be given to each 𝑤𝑎𝑘 based on 
ownership of that object. The experts proposed to assign 0.2 for the object that belong to group a 
of people (𝑤𝑚), 0.5 for the object whom belong to a location (𝑤𝑙), and 0.9 for the object whom 
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belong to a person (𝑤𝑢). Alternatively, the system administrator can assign the proper value based 
on ambient objects ownership. 
Three examples are covering the potential scenarios. Firstly, user 𝑖𝑑2registers one of his devices 
and that device is owned by 𝑖𝑑2, the function 𝑤𝑎𝑘 calculates the ambient object weigh. 
𝑎𝑜2 = [′18 − 67 − 80 − 5𝐷 − 3𝐹 − 4𝐵′, ′𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘′, ′𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟
′, 𝑖𝑑2, 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙] 
Secondly, user 𝑖𝑑3 and user 𝑖𝑑4 are both registered one of their device and, that device is owned 
by 𝑖𝑑3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑑4, the function 𝑤𝑎𝑘 calculates the ambient object weigh. 
𝑎𝑜3 = [′23 − 𝐴7 − 𝐷0 − 5𝐴 − 4𝐵 − 42′, ′𝐿𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑝′, ′𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟
′, 𝑖𝑑3, 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙] 
𝑎𝑜3 = [′23 − 𝐴7 − 𝐷0 − 5𝐴 − 4𝐵 − 42
′, ′𝐿𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑝′, 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟′, 𝑖𝑑4, 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙] 
Finally, 𝑎𝑜4 is an object belongs to main office (𝑙𝑜𝑐_9), a registered user was holding that device 
and heading to the main office door. 
 𝑎𝑜49 = [′𝑖𝑃𝑎𝑑′, ′𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
′, 𝑖𝑑4, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_9] 
3.2.3 Mapping an Activity to User History 
User’s history implies the user’s behaviour which regards as a clue to find the potential location 
of the user at certain time and location. Mining this information can be individually or as a group 
of users. CAIV approach is to find the individual behaviour of each user which make it more 
relevant to the user’s attitude. We need to find the probability of the user to access a new location 
(visited location) when he moved from a current location (pre-visited location) based on history 
logs.  
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    The history probability relies on Markov chain. Markov chain is stochastic a process named 
after Andrey Markov a Russian mathematician. It is called memoryless since it is categorised as a 
random process. In a Markov chain, the probability of an event at any point in time is a function 
of the likelihood with which events occurred at previous time periods (Luger, 2005). Time-
homogeneous Markov chain with one-step transition probability has been used in CAIV modelling 
since we don’t need more than one step transitions between the environment locations, (3-9) 
showing the Markov Chain formula.   
𝐏 = [
𝒑𝟏𝟏   𝒑𝟏𝟐   𝒑𝟏𝟑 ⋯ 𝒑𝟏𝒈
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒑𝒊𝟏   𝒑𝐢𝟐   𝒑𝐢𝟑 ⋯ 𝒑𝒊𝒈
]   3-9 (Behrends, 2000) 
Where:         
- 𝑖, 𝑔 is the number of locations in the pervasive computing environment 
-  0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑔 ≤ 1  
-  𝑖, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐿  
- ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔
𝑛
g=1 = 1 
∀ 𝑖𝑑𝑗  ∃! 𝑃𝑗 
Given a user j with an identity 𝑖𝑑𝑗, there is a list of potential locations (based on the 
environment’s available locations) which are possible to be attended by users; the history logs of 
the users stored in the history log (𝐻𝑗  ) such that: 
𝐻𝑗 = {ℎjn ∶ 𝑛 = 1, … , ℎ𝑠}, ℎ𝑠 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑗 
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Each user history log is represented as a tuple (vector) as follows:  
ℎjn = [𝑖𝑑𝑗 , 𝑙𝑛, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑛,  𝑝𝑙𝑛, 𝑡𝑛]   where   
   𝑖𝑑𝑗     - the identifier of user j 
 𝑙𝑛     - the location where the activity is performed  
   𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑛 – the history log status, success =1, or failed =0 
𝑝𝑙𝑛    - pre-visited location of 𝑙𝑛 
𝑡𝑛      - is the time of the activity   
Now as user j performs an activity (𝑎, 𝑒. 𝑔. 𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑝𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑) as in instance of 𝐴, 
 see Equation 2-1: 
𝑎 = [𝑖𝑑𝑗 , 𝑙𝑎, 𝑡𝑎] 
To find the probability (History Weight (WH)) of attending the activity location, 
𝑤ℎ𝑎 = P( 𝑝𝑙𝑎, 𝑙𝑎)𝑗,     𝑝𝑙𝑎, 𝑙𝑎  ∈ 𝐿,  
𝑤ℎ𝑎     - the weight of user j to be at the activity location when he moved  
      from the previous location 𝑝𝑙𝑎 which stored in ℎjn 
                , 𝑤ℎ𝑎 ∈ [0,1], 
𝑙𝑎 ∃! 𝑝𝑙𝑎   - 𝑝𝑙𝑎 is the pre-visited location of activity location 𝑙𝑎 
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The system maps activity (𝑎) to each history in 𝐻j such that a list of weight values (WH) is 
produced, as follows:    
 𝒇𝒉 = 𝑾𝑯 = {
∀ 𝒉 ∈ 𝑯𝐣, 𝒘𝒉𝒂, 𝐢𝐟  𝒍𝒂 =  𝒍𝒏 , 𝒕𝒏 = 𝒕𝒂, 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒏 = 𝟏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒍𝒂 = 𝒑𝒍𝒏 
 𝟎, 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
  
3-10 
As an example, a user 𝑖𝑑1with pre-visited location (𝑙𝑜𝑐4) is heading to the destination (𝑙𝑜𝑐7), the 
system was able to calculate the history weight of that activity which is 0.6. The history weight 
can find it by the system, based on Markov Chain method which manipulated the history logs of 
the past month; the history record had been stored as follows: 
ℎ17 = [𝑖𝑑1, 𝑙𝑜𝑐7, 1, 𝑙𝑜𝑐4, ′2016 − 12 − 12 9: 00′] 
Now let 𝑓ℎbe a function representing the contribution of the history context to the trust such that: 
3-10 showed that the system maps the activity (𝑎) to the history log associated with location 𝑙𝑎. 
The weighting value is determined by Markov Chain algorithm for each associated pair of (pre-
visited and destination locations) and determine how much is that weight  𝑤ℎ𝑘 if existed based on 
the number of visits to that location on a period of time. For instance, the user 1 had three history 
logs from location 4 to three different locations; which are[𝑖𝑑1, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_2, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_4] the calculated 𝑝47 is 
 0.3, [𝑖𝑑1, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_7, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_4] the calculated 𝑝46 is  0.6, and  [ 𝑖𝑑1, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_6, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_4] the calculated 𝑝42 is  0.1. 
That is based on the proportional visits for one location over the total visits (10) done by user 1. 
The credits of these visits are three times from loc_4 to loc_2, six times from loc_4 to loc_7, and 
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once from loc_4 to loc_6 over the past month. Based on the number of visits for location 2,7,6; 
the weight(probability) has been calculated for each potential location.  
3.2.4 Mapping an Activity to User Calendar 
Calendar event organises and stores information about location(s) that the user tends to access in 
the pervasive computing environment. The iCalendar format is used to help the CAIV model to 
understand the priority of each event. According to iCalendar, the event has three different types, 
which are VEVENT, VTODO, and VJOURNAL. Section 4.3.2 illustrates further details about 
iCalendar. The mathematical representation of Calendar event as follows: 
Given a user j with an identity 𝑖𝑑𝑗, there is a list of calendar events 𝐶𝑗  such that: 
𝐶𝑗 = {𝑐js ∶ 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑒𝑣𝑗}, 𝑒𝑣𝑗  is the number of calendar events for user j 
Each calendar event is represented as a tuple (vector) as follows: 
𝑐js = [𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟, 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑡𝑠, 𝑖𝑑𝑗 , 𝑙𝑠] 
where 
           𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟 - textual description of 𝑐jk 
 type   - the event type; it has three kinds (vjounal, vtodo, and vevent) 
  , they are ranked low, medium, and high respectively  
 𝑡𝑠       - the event time 
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𝑙𝑠       -  the location where 𝑐jk is associated 
𝒘𝒆𝒔 = 𝒇(𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆) = {
𝒘𝒋                                         𝒊𝒇 𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆 = 𝐯𝐣𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐚𝐥 
𝒘𝒕                                            𝒊𝒇  𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆 = 𝐯𝐭𝐨𝐝𝐨
𝒘𝒆                                          𝒊𝒇  𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆 = 𝐯𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐭
 3-11 
Now as user j performs an activity (𝑎, 𝑒. 𝑔. 𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑝𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑) as instance of 𝐴, see Equation 2-1: 
𝑎 = [𝑖𝑑𝑗 , 𝑙𝑎, 𝑡𝑎] 
The system maps activity (𝑎) to each calendar in 𝐶j such that a list of weight values (WE) is 
produced, as follows:  
𝑾𝑬 = {
∀ 𝒄 ∈ 𝑪𝐣, 𝒘𝒆𝒔, 𝐢𝐟  𝒍𝒂 =  𝒍𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 |𝒕𝒂 − 𝒕𝒔| ≤ 𝒕𝒕 
 𝟎, 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
              3-12 
Where: 
 𝑤𝑒𝑠    - is a derivative weight based on calendar type of 𝑐js, 𝑤𝑒𝑠 ∈ [0,1] 
𝑡𝑡  -  is the time tolerance in minutes 
Now let 𝑓𝑐be a function representing the contribution of the calendar context to the trust such 
that: 
𝒇𝒄 = 𝐦𝐚𝐱(𝑾𝑬)                                                3-13 
3-13 states that the system maps the activity (𝑎) to the calendar associated with location 𝑙𝑎, time 
𝑡𝑎 with the highest weight value. The weighting values (𝑤𝑒𝑠) is derived from the calendar type. 
Therefore, the values of 𝑤𝑒𝑠 for the event with vjouranl, vtodo, and vevent are 0.2, 0.5, and 0.9 
respectively. These values have been assigned based on expert opinion which they are ranking 
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calendar types with low, medium and high respectively.  The importance of calendar type has been 
decided based on their knowledge and the description of those three types.  
Since the event type has three categories, there are three different use cases of calendar tuples.  
Use Case 1 
Firstly, a registered user with id1 has added a calendar event (IoT seminar) as a vjournal type. 
Accordingly, the calendar tuple of that event is stored in the system as:  
𝑐110 = [′𝐼𝑜𝑇  𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟′, ′𝑣𝑗𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙′, ′2016 − 12 − 12 11: 00′, 𝑖𝑑1, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_10] 
Use Case 2 
Secondly, a registered user with id2 has added a calendar event (Fog Computing Workshop) as a 
vtodo type. Accordingly, the calendar tuple of that event stored in the system as:  
𝑐222 = [′𝐹𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑝′, ′𝑣𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜′, ′2016 − 12 − 12 02: 00′, 𝑖𝑑2, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_22] 
Use Case 3 
Finally, a registered user with id3 has added a calendar event (Advance Programming II) as a 
vevent type. Accordingly, the calendar tuple of that event stored in the system as:  
𝑐313 = [′𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝐼′, ′𝑣𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡′, ′2016 − 12 − 12 10: 00′, 𝑖𝑑2, 𝑙𝑜𝑐_13] 
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3.3 Conclusion  
To sum up the CAIV approach; it is required to come up with a result or conclusion of each profile. 
That profile represents the available context at a certain time and location. As illustrated above in 
(3-4) and the way in which it maps these parameters to infer the trust value, therefore, there is a 
need to use an inferring technique to find the trust value. A reasong method need to be used to infer 
the trust value by using a Multiple Input Single Output (MISO) approach. The four inputs are 
interpreted into a single output. That output represents the trust value which consequently reflects 
how much the system trusts that user in a certain event.  
Therefore, the target formula for user j is as illustrated in 3-14 below:  
𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒋 = 𝑹𝑴(𝒇𝒄𝒋 , 𝒇𝒉𝒋 , 𝒇𝒂𝒋, 𝒇𝒑𝒋) , where RM is a Reasoning Method               3-14 
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Chapter 4  
CAIV Architecture  
and Design 
 
 
4.1 Introduction    
This chapter describes the CAIV architecture and design. It presents the architecture of CAIV by 
illustrating the core components, parameters, trust, scenarios and fuzzy concept of CAIV. It shows 
how the CAIV framework mimics human beings in taking a decision to decide the user level of 
trust. Furthermore, it shows how the system is capable of utilising and exploiting available context 
to find the trust level. Knowing the trust value level makes the system capable of verifying user 
identity by trusting or distrusting a user’s activity.  
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4.2 Overview of the CAIV Inference  
Reasoning is the practice of inferring information about some unobservable aspect of a situation 
based on information about the observed parts of the situation (Bhatnagar and Kanal, 1992). There 
are several methods can be used to build the reasoning engine. Fuzzy logic is chosen for the 
ensuing reasons in section 4.6 There are two types of fuzzy inference systems, which are Sugeno 
and Mamdani. Mamdani has been used to infer the trust value of the user since it uses membership 
function rather than constant function.  
There are seven types of inference methods: deduction, induction, default reasoning, non-
monotonic reasoning, analogy, abduction and heuristics. Deductive logical reasoning relies on 
previous facts to derive a conclusion. Heuristics are based on rules of thumb which are extracted 
from experience (Novák, 1999).  
The heuristics approach is used to find CAIV’s fuzzy rules. Later on, these rules are utilised by a 
deductive logic approach in the reasoning process. Ross (2009) mentioned that fuzzy logic is 
primarily used in deductive reasoning. 
4.3 Components of an Identity Inferring System 
There are different approaches to classify context parameters (Perera et al., 2014). Abowd et al. 
(1999) believe that there are two types of parameter: primary parameters and secondary 
parameters. However, others (Henricksen, 2003; Van Bunningen, Feng and Apers, 2005) have a 
different classification. We agree with the first approach, yet we defined the context parameters 
slightly differently. 
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 The primary parameters have been acquired from the pervasive environment based on W4H 
classification for context data (Truong, Abowd and Brotherton, 2001). We advocate their approach 
with some modifications to mapping them into our system: 
• Who are the activity participants? (Identity) (Ambient Objects) 
• Where does the activity take place? (Location) (Event Location) 
• When does the activity take place? (Time) (Event Time) 
• What does the user prefer? (User Preferences) 
• How was the user behaving before? (History Previous Logs) 
ambient objects, calendar event, user preference and history log are used as inputs to the system 
to infer (verify) the user’s identity as shown in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 : CAIV Parameters Union to Infer User Identity 
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4.3.1 User Preferences 
User preferences are the locations that the user would like or prefer to visit if he/she has spare time 
in order to tailor a system based on them. There are two approaches to finding user preferences. It 
can be fixed or dynamic. The fixed one can be aggregated from the user directly during the user’s 
registration process; the system asks the user to answer a few questions. These questions are related 
to the user’s preferences and hobbies, if applicable. Consequently, these answers are used to weight 
the destination locations which are related to the preferences. 
For instance, ranked questions with a rating scale (seldom, occasionally and frequently) can be 
used to feed the system with the user preferences which consequently can be utilised as input to 
the CAIV system; the rating scale is respectively ranked as low, medium, high. The other approach 
is used to infer a user’s preferences without user intervention such as that used by Lin and Fu 
(2007), which used Bayesian Network in the learning process; the data are aggregated over a period 
of time and then the system learns from these data the user preference. In the CAIV’s case, the 
first approach has been chosen because of the lack of data and that help to speed up the test and 
evaluation process. Table 4-1 shows the sample of three answers of a user’s questions about 
preferable places that they are likely to visit if they have spare time. 
Table 4-1: Sample Data of User Preferences 
Preference variables Preference Preference’s question Answers Location representation 
P 1 Reading Frequently L1 
P 2 Play Tennis  Seldom L2 
P 3 Drink coffee Occasionally L3 
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4.3.2 Calendar 
The calendar organises users’ tasks and helps them to fulfil their commitments at the work 
environment. It includes all important notes and events. It records notes (e.g. event, task, meeting, 
lecture and others) which are noted with an associated location and time. These notes are stored in 
a specific form in the system, such as iCalendar. The event should be completely noted on the 
calendar, and any missing parts (location or time) make that event unusable. The standard 
iCalendar is used to make the proposed solution interoperable with any existed solution (system) 
that already uses iCalendar. The iCalendar has three main types of event. Journal entry 
(VJOURNAL), To-do (VTODO) and Events (VEVENT). They are ranked as low, medium, high, 
respectively. Table 4-2 is the sample data of the calendar.  
Table 4-2: Sample Data of Calendar 
Calendar variables  Activity  Location  Event type 
C1 Meeting L1 VTODO 
C2 Workshop L2 VEVENT 
C3 Meet Alice at Lobby  L4  VJOURNAL 
 
4.3.2.1  iCalendar 
Events play an enormous role in the CAIV system, therefore, choosing a proper event standard is 
essential for two reasons. First, it makes the solution portable and interoperable, and second, the 
standard solution gives robustness to the proposed solution by complying with a well-known 
standard. For these reasons, iCalendar has been chosen. iCalendar is a unified format of any event. 
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It is used to send tasks and events between internet users. iCalendar was proposed by Dawson et 
al. (1998) and published as RFC2445 by the IETF.  
Events (VEVENT) describes an event, for a specific period of time which has a DTSTART as a 
start time and DTEND as an end time. This event can be taken into account after the user accepts 
the calendar event. To-do (VTODO) is a long-term event which can be achieved by additional 
time. The SEQUENCE element is used to maintain the number of times it shows how many times 
the event has been modified. Journal entry (VJOURNAL) is a journal entry. It works as a note 
reminder. It does not affect the status of the user (Free, Busy). Below is a sample file of iCalendar 
version 1.0 (Dawson et al., 1998). 
ICalendar sample code: 
BEGIN: VCALENDAR 
VERSION: 1.0 
BEGIN: VEVENT 
CATEGORIES: MEETING 
STATUS: TENTATIVE 
DTSTART: 19960401T033000Z 
DTEND: 19960401T043000Z 
SUMMARY: Your Proposal Review 
DESCRIPTION: Steve and John to review newest proposal material 
CLASS: PRIVATE 
END: VEVENT 
END: VCALENDAR 
 61 
 
4.3.3 Ambient Objects 
Ubiquitous technology is growing exponentially and appearing everywhere. Therefore, this 
technology needs to be exploited in CAIV’s approach to facilitate a user’s identity verification. It 
exists in many different things around us in the pervasive environment, such as smart objects and 
devices. These objects are most likely to be equipped with a connectivity technologies; these 
technologies are Wi-Fi, BLE, RFID, NFC, etc.  
In the CAIV method, ambient objects are classified based on possession into three types. The 
ambient object is owned by only one user, a location or by a group of users. An ambient object 
means any object(s) surrounding the user during the identity verification process which is (are) 
detectable by the CIAV terminal sensors. Schilit et al. (1994) described the ambient object 
implicitly by “who you are with”. The possession is assigned to the object in the registration phase; 
Table 4-3 shows three different objects with three different possession types.  
Table 4-3: Sample Data of Ambient Objects 
Ambien Object Identifier Object  Possession User ID 
A1 Laptop Owned by User ID1 
A2 Book Owned by Group of 
Users  
ID1 
A3 Mug1  Owned by Location - 
(1)The canteen is the location of the Mug 
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4.3.4 History Logs 
A user’s history can reveal a certain behaviour of the user in the pervasive environment. It can tell 
the potential action of a user by relying on previous activities. There are different approaches to 
exploit history data to predict the future. The user history log has been used in CAIV to find the 
probability of the user to attend a location with time, the system learns about the user to build 
enough knowledge (history) of users. This knowledge may vary depending on context sizes 
(environment) such as number of locations and number of events per day. Once the system learns 
its knowledge about a user, it becomes capable of predicting the next destination of the user based 
on prior knowledge. There are different prediction techniques that can be used to infer the next 
location. CAIV uses Markov Chain as a proof of concept. Table 4-4 shows a sample of pre-visited 
locations of a user history log.  
 
Table 4-4: Sample Data of User’s History Logs 
History Log ID Pre-visited Location Next Location User ID 
1 𝑙1 𝑙6 1 
2 𝑙1 𝑙5 1 
3 𝑙1 𝑙8 1 
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4.4 CAIV Trust Algorithm  
The CAIV trust algorithm maintains four parameters as input and one single output. The four 
parameters are user preferences, ambient objects, history logs, and calendar event; Algorithm 1 
gives an overview of the trust algorithm. There are four functions to aggregate the probability 
value of each of the context parameters which represent a part of the truth by using a Find function. 
This function relies on the user’s identity, time and location to find related information about the 
identity holder. Later, the find_trust_value function finds the final value of trust which is resulted 
based on the fuzzy inference engine. The value of trust is compared against a preset threshold 
value. Finally, the user status returns as an output of the algorithm.   
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Algorithm 1: CAIV Algorithm 
1: for all Login activity do  
2: If User is valid user Then  
3:  A=Find (User preferences weight for this activity) 
4:  B=Find (Ambient Object weight for this activity) 
5:  C=Find (History weight for this activity) 
6:  D=Find (Calendar weight for this activity) 
7:  Trust = find_trust_value(A,B,C,D) 
8:  If (Trust ≥ threshold ):  
9:             User_Status=Trusted User 
10:    Else 
         User_Status=not-trusted user 
11:  Output User_Status 
12: Else 
13: Output (Unregistered User) 
CAIV architecture has three main layers. The first layer is the aggregation layer which is 
responsible for aggregating the related data from databases (logical sensors) or the available data 
from physical sensors such as Bluetooth beacons, RFID antenna or any other sensor. The 
acquisition data tagged with an associated parameter of the context and transferred to the next 
layer. The second layer is the reasoning layer, which is responsible for retaining the extracted rules 
 65 
 
and applying them into the aggregated data to find the trust value. Reasoning layer act as a CAIV 
brain, contains the main reasoning method which is tailored to fit the CAIV context parameters. 
This layer manipulates the received data and send the result to the next layer. Finally, the 
presentation layer which represents the output layer. It works as interface between the user and the 
core system. It obtains the trust value from the second layer and compares it against the threshold 
value. The threshold value is customisable by the system administer. Eventually, it returns the user 
activity status. The status can be a failure or success message displayed on the terminal screen, an 
alarm(alert), trigger an action (such as send a signal to open an electronic lock), and so on. Figure 
4.2 shows the CAIV architecture, while Figure 4.3 shows the general flow of the CAIV method.  
 
Figure 4.2 : CAIV Architecture 
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Figure 4.3: General Flow of CAIV Verification Process 
4.5 CAIV Scenarios 
A scenario is an essential and descriptive tool for brainstorming ideas, thoughts and visions of any 
deployment environment, especially when this environment does not exist or is out of the 
researcher’s budget and time scale. In the literature, there are different definitions, explanations 
and uses of scenarios. They help us during the design phase of getting some of the system’s 
requirements and at the same time validating the CAIV approach.  
Carroll (2000) defined a scenario as “A direct approach is explicitly to envision and document 
typical and significant activities early and continuingly in the development process. It supports 
reasoning about situations of use, even before those situations are actually created”  
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Potts (1995) defined scenarios as narrative descriptions of interactions between users and proposed 
systems; concrete scenarios help users and designers to develop a shared understanding of the 
proposed system’s functionality.  
Carroll (2000) described the criteria which can be used to define the optimum number of scenarios 
as “A set of scenarios has good coverage if it includes examples of the significant uses of a system 
and the major types of agents, goals, actions, events, obstacles, contingencies, and outcomes that 
constitute these uses”, which is quite similar to Potts definition.  
Alexander & Beus-Dukic (2009) divided scenario building into three phases, discovering, 
documenting and validation phases, as shown in Figure 4.4. The discovering phase can be achieved 
through three contexts methods, which are the interviews, observation and workshops. They also 
divided the discovering scenarios into normal and negative scenarios. The first type is the normal 
scenario “happy day”, while the latter can be exceptions, intentional threats or unwanted scenarios.  
 
 
 
The documenting phase represents the way that the developer depicts the acquired scenarios which 
are consequently quantified by a number of details of scenarios. They divided scenario 
documenting into four types: unstructured stories, storyboards, operational scenarios and use 
cases.  
Discovering 
Scenarios 
Documenting 
Scenarios 
Validating  
Scenarios 
Figure 4.4 : Building Scenarios Phases 
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The validation phase is used since scenarios are a basic way for operational stakeholders to 
describe how they work and how they want to work in the future. The point of validating scenarios 
is to ensure that the same stakeholders are happy with what has been documented. Alexander and 
Beus-Dukic stated that there are four methods to validate the produced scenarios; these methods 
are scenario walkthroughs, animation, simulation and prototyping.  
Moreover, Alexander & Maiden (2005) stated that simulation is capable of giving precise answers 
about whether such a scenario can be realised with any plausible design. Therefore, building the 
CAIV’s simulator is for validating the scenarios and, consequently, the whole approach.  
4.5.1 Scenarios  
Every system has a large number of usage scenarios. Therefore, it is necessary to have a limited 
number of scenarios which are capable of representing the whole relevant system cases. According 
to Caroll, sound scenarios should cover the significant uses of a system, therefore, the CAIV 
proposed scenarios cover all CAIV parameters and their combinations. The parameters have been 
used to derive and develop the proposed scenarios. Since the scenarios need an environment to use 
as a case study, a brief description of the selected environment and consequent proposed scenarios 
are illustrated below.  
The description of a case study domain of the pervasive environment, which uses iCalendar, 
ambient objects, user preferences and user’s history log as a knowledge base is as follows. It is 
assumed that the pervasive computing environment domain includes one building, B1. The 
building has a number of rooms, numbered from ‘01’ to ‘n’. There are two main entrances to the 
B1 building. Everybody has access to the first entrance; it leads to the reception front desk. The 
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second entrance is only accessible by registered users. The system uses context (the four 
parameters) to verify the user’s identity. The user is asked to verify(prove) their identity by another 
method (additional credential(s)) such as pin code, fingerprint or any other method if the system 
CAIV method fails to verify their identity. RFID card used in the domain as a user identifier.  
There is a certain level of trust (the threshold) that the user needs to reach to make the system more 
confident of their identity (to trust the user). On achieving this level of trust, the system does not 
ask the user for further credentials to verify their identity and it will settle for the RFID card only 
as user’s identification. The trust level is a range between 0 and 1; it can be chosen according to 
the system’s policy which can be low, medium or high, which is called system threshold. The trust 
level can be decided according to certain criteria. Moreover, the trust value which is aggregated 
from the context should be greater than or equal to the threshold value (the trust level). Table 4-5 
shows the possible rules combinations of context parameters; the next section gives operational 
scenarios of the CAIV system. 
An operational scenario is an engineering story that describes operations that the product or 
service is intended to support. The real value of this is to show developers, who may be far from 
actual operations, what result they should be trying to achieve, rather than a set of disconnected 
features. 
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Table 4-5: Parameters Combinations Table 
ID Calendar User 
Preferences 
Ambient 
Objects 
History 
#1  - - - 
#2   - - 
#3   -  
#4     
#5 -  - - 
#6 -  -  
#7 -    
#8 - - - - 
Key: 
The parameter is not existed  - 
The parameter is existed   
Scenario 1: The time is 2:55 pm, Bob is heading to B1 to reach room no. 3; he swipes his ID card 
in order to verify his identity and enter the room. The system checks his calendar and finds that 
there is an event noted on Bob’s calendar. This event shows that Bob has an appointment in B1, 
room no. 3 with Alice at 3:00 pm. It is five minutes before the appointment. The system lets Bob 
in by opening the door lock; the system tolerance time is up to 15 minutes before or after the exact 
time. 
Scenario 2: The time is 9:55 am, Bob is heading to B1 to use the gym. The system checks his 
calendar and there is no event related to this location. Then the system moves to the preferences 
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and finds that the gym is one of Bob’s preferred locations. The system checks Bob’s status and it 
is active. At this point, the system lets Bob in by opening the door lock without asking him for 
more credentials (the system trusts Bob). 
Scenario 3: Bob borrowed a book from the library. He is heading to his room. He is holding the 
book. He swipes his card to enter his room. The system cannot find any event on the calendar or a 
preference related to this location. The system detects an object near Bob. It finds that object (the 
book) is related to Bob (an object belonging to a user). The system lets Bob enter the room.  
Scenario 4: Bob has an experiment to do at Mike’s lab; it is Lab 1. Mike hands him two of the 
experiment components to help him run the experiment in his lab. Bob swipes his ID to access Lab 
1. He has an active status but he does not have preferences, a calendar event or a history log to 
make the system trust him (verify his identity). The system detects two objects belonging to Lab 
1 near Bob. Bob reaches a certain level of trust. The system lets him enter the Lab. 
Scenario 5: Bob has left his office and is heading to Lab 3. He swipes his ID to get into the lab. 
The system cannot find any related information from the context except the history. Bob, for the 
last four weeks, has gone from his office to Lab 3 when he has a chance to do this. The system lets 
Bob enter Lab 3. 
Scenario 6: Bob forgets his ID card at home. He tends to enter the main office. He holds his gadget 
(smartphone, smartwatch, smart glasses, etc.) with enabled Bluetooth. He was previously asked 
by the system whether he desires to use these devices as an alternative identifier in the future and 
he accepted. Bob realises that he has forgotten his ID card. He uses his gadget to confirm his 
identity. The system verifies his identity and starts looking for a relevant event, preference, ambient 
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object or history. The system has detected Bob's smartphone and the main office is one of Bob’s 
preferences. The system lets Bob enter the main office.  
Scenario 7: It is 2:30 pm. Bob would like to do some exercises so he goes to the gym and swipes 
his ID. The system finds that the gym is one of Bob’s preferences and he has some history logs 
which show that Bob used to access the gym repeatedly after leaving the school lobby. The system 
lets Bob in. 
Scenario 8: It is 12:30 pm. Bob reaches the canteen door; he swipes his ID to enter the canteen. 
The system detects Bob’s mug which he took with him yesterday to his office as usual. Moreover, 
the system found some history logs which show that Bob used to attend at the canteen hall after 
leaving his office. The system trusts Bob and lets him in without further verification. 
Scenario 9: Viv heads to the conference room to attend a conference session. The coordinator 
hands her the seminar portfolio and conference attendance badge (a temporary ID card). Viv is 
heading to the conference hall. The system detects that Viv holds two things: a seminar portfolio 
which is linked to the meeting room and an attendance badge which is also related to the same 
location (conference hall) and identifies Viv as a conference contributor. The system lets her in. 
Scenario 10: Viv attends a conference situated at B1 building but she is not registered in the 
system. The organiser issues a new badge to Viv. It is valid for the whole event duration. Moreover, 
with the calendar event she does not need further credentials to access any facility within the event 
locations. Viv would like to explore the place and she tries to enter a facility which is not one of 
the event locations. The system will not let her in.  
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Scenario 11 (Exception): Bob presents his slides in conference room 2. While he is walking 
through the room, the ID falls from his pocket. One of the audiences picks up the ID and leaves 
the presentation. He heads to Lab 1. He swipes the ID. The system checks and finds that Bob is 
not used to go to Lab 1 when he leaves conference room 2 and there is no event, preference or an 
object belong to this location. The system raises the alarm.  
Scenario 12 (Exception): Bob ends his workday and has permission for two days’ vacation. He 
goes to the car park, while he is trying to grab his car key from his pocket the ID falls on the 
ground. He goes home and he does not notice that he lost his ID. Trudy finds the ID in the car park. 
The next day, Trudy (the intruder) wants to impersonate Bob’s identity. She tries to enter B1 but 
the system denies her access since Bob is on vacation (inactive status) based on the calendar 
information.  
Scenario 13 (Exception): Trudy stole Bob’s ID card while Bob was having his cup of tea at the 
canteen. She reaches Lab 1 and swipes Bob’s ID card. The system cannot find any related 
information to this activity. Therefore, it requests a pin code to verify his identity. Trudy cannot 
access Lab 1 since she does not know the pin code. The system raises an alarm alert notification 
to the administrator. 
  
 74 
 
4.6 The Reasoning Layer Design 
Fuzzy logic was first introduced by Lotfi A. Zadeh in 1965. Zadeh (1965) defined a fuzzy set as a 
class of objects without a precisely defined criterion of membership. The difference between fuzzy 
logic and classical logic (crisp logic) is that classical logic has two truth values, false and true, 
while the truth values of fuzzy logic are described by linguistic terms such as high, low, moderate 
and so forth (Bělohlávek and Klir, 2011). Furthermore, they deemed that classical logic is a subset 
of fuzzy logic. This leads to fuzzy logic being represented as a generalisation form of crisp logic.  
Van Leekwijck & Kerre (1999) divided fuzzy systems into two categories: fuzzy reasoning (or 
fuzzy knowledge) systems and fuzzy control systems. Fuzzy knowledge systems aim to provide 
some qualitative reasoning system for a specific domain. Fuzzy sets are used to map qualitative 
facts onto numerical entities that can be manipulated by the computer. The result of a 
“computation” in these systems is a qualitative expression based on the input to the system. 
Fuzzy controllers always need a crisp value as a result; a result stating that a certain valve has to 
be opened “somewhat” is not very useful in a control system. Fuzzy sets are used as a convenient 
tool to define control rules and to make inferences. Figure 4.5 shows the general flow of a fuzzy 
system.  
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Figure 4.5: Overview Diagram of a Fuzzy System 
Fuzzification process is to convert crisp value to fuzzy value. While the defuzzification is the 
conversion of a fuzzy quantity to a precise quantity (crisp value). There are many methods which 
proposed for defuzzifying fuzzy output function, such as max membership principle, centroid 
method, weight average method, and mean max membership (Ross, 2009). 
Table 4-6 shows that fuzzy logic flexibility and reliability are the reasons behind choosing fuzzy 
logic to infer a user’s identity. Added to this, it does not need a large dataset and it is more 
understandable and traceable by the developer while some other approaches need a big dataset and 
are regarded as a black box so the result cannot be explained or backtracked. Fuzzy logic can hold 
the uncertainty of CAIV model in finding the trust value.  
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Table 4-6: Comparison of Techniques in Terms of Modelling Capabilities (Gray and MacDonell, 
1997) 
Technique Model-
free 
Can resist 
outliers 
Explains 
output 
Suits small 
data sets  
Can be 
adjusted for 
new data  
Reasoning 
process is 
visible 
Suits 
complex 
models 
Includes 
known 
facts 
Least squares 
regression 
X X ~ X X ✓ X ~ 
Robust regression X ✓ ~ ~ X ✓ X ~ 
Neural networks ✓ X X X ~ X ✓ ~ 
Fuzzy systems 
(adaptive) 
✓ ~   ✓ ✓ ~ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Hybrid neuro-
fuzzy systems 
✓ ~ ✓ ~ ~ ~ ✓ ✓ 
Rule-based 
systems 
X N/A ✓ N/A N/A ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Case-based 
reasoning 
✓ ~ ✓ ~  ✓  ~ ✓ X 
Regression trees ✓ ✓ ✓ ~  ✓  ~ ✓ ~ 
Classification or 
decision Tress 
✓ ✓ ✓ ~  ✓  ~ ✓ ~ 
Key:   
 
       
Yes ✓ 
No  X 
Partially  ~ 
 
Furthermore, Pradhan & Pirasteh (2010) have validation results that show that the prediction 
accuracy of fuzzy logic and neural networks are slightly different; the accuracy for both of them 
are around 90%. Their result shows that fuzzy logic can be as reliable as a neural network. 
 77 
 
Bělohlávek & Klir (2011) defined a fuzzy set as appropriate sets of numbers that represent 
linguistic terms such as many, most, almost all, very few and so forth. 
Given a fuzzy set A defined on a universal set U.  
U: A(x) >0 is …. Called a support of A 
U: A(x) =0 is …. Called a core of A 
U: A(x) not empty is …. Called a normal fuzzy set 
All other fuzzy sets are called subnormal.  
Level cut α-cut of A (𝐴𝛼) is a classical set of all objects x of U for which A(x) ≥ α  
𝐴𝛼={x ∈ U: A(x) ≥ α} 
4.6.1 Fuzzy Rules  
Information is step forward knowledge; the latter is the core of a rule-based approach. Fuzzy rules 
are generated from two sources: numerical information acquired from sensors and linguistic 
information gained from experts (Wang and Mendel, 1992). Wang & Mendel stated that they could 
rely on the experience of human beings to extract some rules. Figure 4.6 shows the fuzzy expert 
system architecture by describing the knowledge(rules) extraction and the dialogue and validation 
processes between the knowledge engineer and the experts.  
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Figure 4.6: Architecture of a Fuzzy Expert System 
Hong & Lee (1996) stated that “to apply expert systems in decision-making, having the capacity 
to manage uncertainty and noise are quite important”. They also stated that fuzzy logic is 
frequently used in expert systems because of its simplicity and similarity to human reasoning. 
Additionally, they describe the expert as a crucial factor in building expert systems. They stated 
that experts and experienced users contribute to building the member function. 
There are two main approaches of a FIS (fuzzy inference system), namely, the approaches of 
Mamdani (Mamdani and Assilian, 1975) and Sugeno (Takagi and Sugeno, 1985). The differences 
between the two approaches arise from the following. Mamdani’s approach uses fuzzy 
membership functions (MFs) whereas Sugeno’s approach uses linear or constant functions. Since 
the CAIV approach does not have a constant function, a Mamdani approach is utilised for the 
CAIV inference engine.  
Knowledge & 
Common-sense  
Human Expert 
Knowledge 
Engineer Dialogue  
Expert System 
Knowledge Base Validation   
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The CAIV inference engine is designed on Matlab. Figure 4.7 shows the fuzzy decision engine 
inputs and output. The setting of the inputs and the output membership function set based on the 
CAIV membership functions. The CAIV rules fed into the Matlab tool box. As CAIV method uses 
Mamdani inference, the defuzzification is used the centroid method.  
 
Figure 4.7 : CAIV Fuzzy Trust Model 
Figure 4.8 shows the fuzzy rules of the inference engine in the Fuzzy Matlab toolbox. CAIV has 
81 rules. These rules were discussed with experts. The CAIV is designed with the ability to 
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rectify these rules in the future, in case the method performance is low or is breached because of 
some inaccurate rule.  
 
Figure 4.8 : Fuzzy Decision Engine Rules 
Below are the sample the 81 rules which are used in the Matlab rules engine, Appendix A 
illustrates the list of the rest of the rules:  
1- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Low) 
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2-if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Low) 
………………… 
81- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is High) Then (Trust is High) 
4.6.2 Membership Function  
The output membership function is divided into five intervals based on Lesani & Montazeri. Lesani 
& Montazeri (2009) divided the membership function of trust into five intervals with five linguistic 
variables, low, medium low, medium, medium high and high, as shown in Figure 4.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 : Fuzzy Membership Functions of Trust Linguistic Terms (Output) 
 
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
Low Medium Low Medium Medium High High 
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The input membership function for all parameters falls into three intervals, the lingustic variables 
are (Low, Medium and High) as shown in Figure 4.10. The experts defined the intervals as follow, 
0.1-0.3 for low, 0.3-0.6 for medium, and 0.6-1.0 for high.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 : Fuzzy Membership Functions of Input Linguistic Terms 
 
  The fuzzy inference engine is implemented on Matlab R2016a.  
Figure 4.11 shows the six figures  of interdependency between the context-parameter pairs (inputs) 
and the output (trust). These six figures were generated by the Matlab surface plot. Every 
parameter, when combined with other parameters, has a specific point(value) which influence on 
the trust value. The calendar parameter, combined with the history logs parameter and the 
preferences parameter, better influenced the trust value when the influence was started at 0.23, 
while it influenced the trust value less, when combined with the ambient object parameter, when 
the influence of trust value was started at 0.43. The history log parameter better influenced the 
trust value when it was combined with the calendar parameter, while it influenced the trust less 
when it was combined with the ambient object parameter and the preferences parameter. The 
preferences parameter, combined with the calendar parameter, better influenced the trust value 
0 0.3 
Low Medium High 
1 0.6 
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than it did when combined with the ambient object parameter and history logs parameter. The 
ambient object parameter exhibits a stable, and high, influence over all the other three parameters 
when the trust influence was started at 0.23. We conclude from the six combinations, involving 
two parameters each, which are shown in  
Figure 4.11 that the influencing of the trust value by the context parameters exhibits different 
levels. They significantly affect the influence of the ambient object parameter on the output (trust), 
they have less of an effect on the calendar parameter’s influence on the trust value and the least 
effects on the other two parameters, the history logs and the preferences. The influences which 
cause the input parameters to affect the trust values positively(better) cause the aggregated values 
of the input parameters to affect the trust value, and thus even input parameters with low values 
have some effect. On the other hand, the influences which cause the input parameters to affect the 
trust value negatively(less) are such that affect the trust value with quite moderate input value. 
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(a) Calendar and Preferences                        (b) Ambient Objects and Preferences                            (c) History logs and Calendar 
 
(d) History Logs and Preferences                  (e) History Logs and Ambient Objects                        (f) Ambient Objects and Calendar 
Figure 4.11: Interdependency between Two Context Parameters and Trust
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Figure 4.12 shows a demonstration of giving four different values as input to the fuzzy rule engine 
and how that affects the trust value, which is situated at the right side of the Matlab Fuzzy toolbox 
snapshot. The calendar, history log, preferences and ambient object are 0.241, 0.5, 0.5, and 0.5 
respectively, and the trust value (the output) was 0.5 as a result of rule 14.  
Figure 4.12: Rules Aggregations and Outputs 
4.7 Summary  
After selecting the input and output parameters, the aggregation technique of each of them is found 
by relying on literature and brainstorming which achieved through the operational scenarios. The 
potential result shows the interdependency between the input parameters and the output; it also 
shows the overall behaviour of the input parameters compared with the trust value. It shows the 
importance of both calendar and ambient objects in the CAIV method which are more distinctive 
than the other two parameters. The next step is the implementation and testing of the CAIV 
approach.  
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Chapter 5   
CAIV Implementation and 
Testing 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
To implement and test the CAIV method which is presented in Chapter 4, this chapter discusses 
the steps required to achieve this, such as preparing data, choosing and building the necessary 
environment to test CAIV approach and finally building the CAIV prototype. Simulation is a 
virtual representation of real-world scenarios which can mimic a real system process or operations 
of specific solutions run over time. It generates an artificial history of a system and builds up an 
environment to fulfil the whole functional characteristics of the system in a real-world 
implementation. The behaviour of the system is monitored over time. A simulation model needs 
to have a set of assumptions to establish a sound environment. Simulation can also be used to study 
systems in the design stage before such a system is built. Thus, simulation modelling can be used 
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both as an analysis tool for predicting the effect of changes to existing systems and as a design tool 
to predict the performance of new systems under different circumstances (IL, Barry L. Nelson, 
Jerry Banks, 2009). Richard Gran (2012) defined simulation as “the creation of a model that can 
be manipulated logically to decide how the physical world works”. The simulator needs a dataset 
(test data) to quantify the system performance.  
5.2 Test Data Structure and Generation 
 We believe that is hard to find a dataset that uses the CAIV four parameters for two reasons. First, 
the data is sensitive and affects user privacy, and the second reason is availability as it is not 
possible to ask a company to adopt our prototype which is not yet tested. In order to test and 
evaluate the proposed framework, it is necessary to build a CAIV simulator and generate a dataset 
to feedback to it. The dataset is generated randomly. The CAIV simulator design has four essential 
phases as shown in Figure 5.1, which are defining the input data, generating a dataset, performing 
deterministic computation on the input and aggregating the result.  
There are two types of simulation: time-driven and event-driven.  
Time-driven discrete event simulation has been used in CAIV. The time-driven approach needs a 
jump interval within a time frame (Lo, 2014); a 1-hour slot has been used for CAIV simulator 
intervals.  
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A random dataset was generated with 79 subjects (users). Each user has a set of attributes which 
are related to the work environment. Python programming language was used to generate this 
dataset and a Python standard random number generator library is used. The Python random library 
is based on the Wichmann-Hill algorithm (Wichmann and Hill, 1982) by relying on uniform 
distribution. The generated data have been stored in a MYSQL database. Later, the CAIV simulator 
runs the test data (dataset) to get and store the result.  
5.2.1 Datasets 
Since real data is not available, therefore, a synthetic dataset is used which is generated by the 
CAIV dataset generator that we developed. It is designed based on the following model: 
Each calendar event e has a probability, p(e), of appearing in the daily calendar events. For each 
calendar event, the generator specifies four probabilities: (i) the probability of title, p(t|e), (ii) the 
probability of description, p(d|e,t), (iii) the probability of task type, p(tt|e,t,d) and (iv) the 
probability of location, p(l|e,t,d,tt). For example, we have a list of first names and last names, the 
probability to have a complete name is by picking up a random name from these two lists. That 
procedure is applied for the aforementioned features of the calendar. 
For the ambient object generation, it is assumed that each user has a set of objects. Each set has 
six objects generated randomly; each object has four essential attributes of description, ambient 
object type and ambient object location which are assigned randomly.  
Finally, user preferences are assumed to have three different preferences for each user. The 
probability of description, preference rate and preference location are assigned randomly.  
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Figure 5.1 : CAIV Simulation Phases 
The dataset generator executed on Python programming language and the results stored in the 
MYSQL database which is ready to be used by CAIV simulator.  
5.3 Simulator Environment  
The CAIV environment that we need to simulate should include all four CAIV parameters to be 
tested against all possible scenarios. The university environment can include the CAIV parameters, 
therefore the university information system has been chosen. It is assumed that the university 
information system is linked with an identity verification module which in our case is the CAIV 
module; the aim of this module is to verify the user’s identity to grant users access to any secure 
location within the environment such as offices, lecture halls, labs, etc.  
The CAIV module represents the main identity verification method of this environment. If the 
CAIV module failed to verify the user identity, the system would ask the user for more credentials 
to verify the user’s identity, to avoid any user interruption. These credentials could be a fingerprint, 
Generate Dataset 
Perform CAIV Algorithm 
Computations  
Aggregate the Result  
Define Inputs 
 90 
 
face recognition, passcode, etc. The passcode was chosen for use in the system to confirm the 
user’s identity since it does not need any additional hardware to be added to the terminal.  
The physical design of the domain is described as a university building which has three floors with 
different facilities as shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: CAIV Environment Building Map 
5.4 CAIV Environment System Design 
The CAIV environment information system is designed with five essential classes which are user 
class, calendar class, history log class, user preferences class and ambient object class, as shown 
in Figure 5.3. There are two more subclasses linked with these five classes, which are the 
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authentication and location classes. Authentication class has a list of authentication credentials. 
The credential description (type) can be a password or RFID, while the value is the password 
(numbers) or RFID number (16-digits). Calendar class includes the information about an event 
such as event name, date, type, starting time and ending time which is assumed a one hour slot in 
the simulator. History log class includes all the user’s attempts with time, location, user ID, log 
status, and parameters4; parameters4 used by experts to monitor the parameters behaviour and 
rectify the rules in the future. User preferences class contains the information of the preferable 
places of the user, such as location ID, description and the percentage of likelihood of the user to 
attend this facility (probabilityRatio). Ambient Object class illustrated the smart objects which 
have description, type, ID, user ID and location ID; the ID can be the physical or MAC address of 
the object. 
  
 Figure 5.3: CAIV ERD 
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The state machine diagram in Figure 5.4 shows the interaction between the user and the CAIV 
module. It starts by swipe the RFID card of the user to the user interface (UI) which is the CAIV 
terminal. The control entity which represented by reasoning engine, aggregating the related data 
from the four context parameters and calculate the trust value (the output). Eventually, send that 
output to the user interface to trigger an action, for example, the UI returns the status as a trusted 
user and send a signal to the electronic lock to open it.   
 
Figure 5.4: State Machine Diagram of CAIV 
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5.5 CAIV Simulation Module 
It is necessary to design a simulator to evaluate the potential performance of the CAIV method. 
This section reviews the specification of the simulation module which is used as a case study to 
test and evaluate the CAIV performance. It aims to investigate the performance of the CAIV 
approach though mimicking the potential real-life scenarios of users by simulating a university 
information system using the CAIV method as the main method to verify user identities in an 
everyday life scenario. The CAIV simulator development has two main phases. The first phase is 
to generate the dataset and the second phase is to build up the simulation engine which can be run 
based on the generated dataset.  
The dataset was generated randomly for 79 users and stored in the information system database. 
The information system has seven main MySQL tables (user, calendar, history log, ambient 
objects, user preferences, locations and authentication). It represents an information system used 
in the university. Python is the programming language platform of the CAIV dataset generator, 
CAIV simulator and CAIV prototype.  
The second phase is to design an environment to mimic the user’s activities during the working 
day. The CAIV simulator is built to achieve this goal. The CAIV simulator assumes that the user 
has a profile which includes the basic components which are shown above in Figure 5.3; the user 
is committed to attend any noted event on their calendar; the user should move to a location when 
they have free time on their calendar that reflects user behaviour in real life. Every single attempt 
is stored in the history log table. Figure 5.5 below shows a set of stored history logs; the trust_val 
column represents the calculated value of trust of each attempt and the logStatus column describes 
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whether the attempt succeeded or failed. The parameters4 column contains the input values (the 
rate of each parameter of an event) aggregated in one value; for example, let us take the first tuple 
with historyID (1); parameters4 has 2090 value; it means that the parameter weights of the user at 
this activity are 0.2 for calendar, 0.0 for history and 0.9 for ambient objects and 0.0 for user 
preferences. It can be used later to validate the fuzzy inference rules or to understand the behaviour 
of the system. It is mainly stored to help an expert or the administrator to maintain (rectify) system 
rules in the future.  
The fuzzy rules system is designed and run by Matlab as shown in Figure 4.7. A short program 
was written to run the whole possible input combination on Matlab and store the whole tuples with 
the trust value in the rules_heap array; below is a sample of this array:  
 
ruls_heap=[[0,0,0,0,0.08], 
           [0,0,0,0.1,0.159885057], 
           [0,0,0,0.2,0.203076923], 
           [0,0,0,0.3,0.212989045], 
           [0,0,0,0.4,0.20729443], 
           [0,0,0,0.5,0.204974811], 
           [0,0,0,0.6,0.20729443], 
           [0,0,0,0.7,0.212989045], 
           [0,0,0,0.8,0.223406593], 
           [0,0,0,0.9,0.235208333], 
 
The first four digits are the combinations of inputs, while the bolded digit on the right is the trust 
value (the result of the FIS).  
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Figure 5.5 : Snapshot of History Log Table in the CAIV simulator database 
5.6 CAIV Prototype  
The aim of building a CAIV prototype is to test and validate the CAIV method over certain 
scenarios and to prove the soundness, deployability, reliability and cost-effectiveness of the CAIV 
solution. The CAIV prototype was developed by using two principal components: the hardware 
component and the software component. The hardware is chosen based on performance and 
availability. Raspberry Pi3 as a main computing unit. There is a set of peripherals that are 
connected to the main computing unit which are the RFID module 13.56mhz Mfrc-rc522, a 4x4 
keypad, an OPEN-SMART I2C / IIC LCD 1602 Display Module, a PIR motion sensor and a BLE 
dongle and Wi-Fi dongle as shown in Figure 5.6. The software is represented by choosing the 
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operating system platform with the RASPBIAN 4.2, Python V3.0 is the programming language 
and MySQL is the DBMS.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: CAIV Terminal Hardware Components 
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(a) LCD shows message of unauthorised user   (b)LCD shows message asks of user’s passcode  
Figure 5.7 : Basic 16x2 Character LCD (a,b) 
 
Figure 5.8: RFID Tags 
 The seven hardware components are assembled via a breadboard which is used to build in each 
terminal. Each component has a certain task to do, as shown in Table 5-1. Figure 5.9 shows the 
boxed CAIV terminal with the attached peripherals and two LED indicators.  
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Table 5-1: CAIV Hardware Components Tasks 
ID Component Name Task(s) 
1.  Raspberry PI 3  It is the main processing unit 
2.  LCD  Output unit to display the system messages to the 
user  
3.  Keypad Input unit to key in the passcode 
4.  Wi-Fi  To provide a hotspot to the user to get access to 
his/her profile 
5.  BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) It used to discover any nearby devices (ambient 
objects) 
6.  PIR motion sensor To trigger a BLE scan to avoid any delay for the user 
7.  RFID RC522  To read a user’s RFID card to identify him/her 
 
 
Figure 5.9: CAIV Terminal 
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The CAIV solution has two deployment options, centeralised and decenteralised. The centeralised 
version deploys a client-server approach as shown in Figure 5.10 while the decenteralised 
approach uses the local database rather than accessing a remote database server, as shown in Figure 
5.11. The hardware platform can handle both of these solutions. Choosing one of them depends on 
the environment infrastructure and user’s requirements.  
The software components are built on a Raspbian operating system (Debian Project, 2017). Python 
is used as the programming language and a MySQL database is used as a DBMS. Using an RFID 
reader and other physical sensors moved us forward to include some essential packages to 
communicate with these prephirals, such as mysql.connector, bluetooth, MFRC522, and RPi.GPIO 
as shown in Appendix B, the sample python code of CAIV terminal. The terminal provides a wifi 
hotspot to the users. The user can access the CAIV web-based portal to maintain his/her profile. 
First, the user needs to login through the homepage as shown in Figure 5.12, then they can modify 
their calendar as shown in Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.10 : CAIV Terminal (Centralised Approach) 
 
Figure 5.11: CAIV Terminal (Decentralised Approach) 
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Figure 5.12: Profile Login Page 
 
Figure 5.13: Add/Modify New Event Page 
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5.7 Summary  
 
This chapter illustrated the test data structure, the simulator design and the prototype 
implementation. It was very challenging to prepare a virtual environment to test and implement 
the proposed method. Due to the time limitation, Python was chosen as a programming language. 
It hastens the process of evaluation since the required libraries to perform the method already 
existed. Additionally, it is available on Raspberry Pi so the transformation process of the method 
from simulator to prototype is achieved seamlessly. The scenarios helped us to brainstorm some 
possible cases that the system faces in the real environment. After this, the simulator result gave 
us a motive to proceed with building a pilot prototype of the virtual environment which proves the 
feasibility of the proposed method.  
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Chapter 6   
Critical Evaluation 
 
 
6.1  Overview  
CAIV evaluation requires performing two main experiments. The first experiment is to find 
out if the system is resistant to any failure in identifying legitimate users, the second experiment 
is to test it against any counterfeit user attempts. The CAIV approach was tested in a simulated 
environment by using a CAIV simulator which based on CAIV method. The CAIV method aims 
to verify a user’s identity in an unobtrusive way by relying on available context. The user uses 
only their RFID card to tell the system about the identity that they claim. The context parameters 
are aggregated from the pervasive environment. If the system (which adopts the CAIV method) 
fails to verify a user’s identity, the system either denies the user’s claim or asks them for more 
credentials as shown in Figure 5.7-b when the system asks the user to enter the passcode to prove 
their identity.  
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Synthetic data have been generated by the dataset generator and stored in the database. The stored 
data have been processed by the CAIV simulator to obtain the CAIV method results. The simulator 
implementation is performed as described in Chapter 5. The following sections present the details 
of the synthetic data, the threshold selection and the result. 
6.2 Synthetic Data 
After the CAIV dataset generator generated the synthetic data, the CAIV simulator was run based 
on these data. It is an essential part of the evaluation process to observe the CAIV behaviour for 
two scenarios, for legitimate users and illegitimate users. The first observation obtained from the 
CAIV simulator assumed that the 79 users were attending whole day events without any intruder 
breach possibility; Figure 6.1 shows the overall distribution of 79 legitimate users who are moving 
between the 35 locations in the CAIV environment. The second scenario assumes that the intruder 
stole (cloned) the RFID card of the user to impersonate the user’s identity and a breach test was 
performed against all 79 users. This attack was run randomly over the 35 locations; Figure 6.2 
shows the distribution of 79 illegitimate users visits to the 35 locations within one working day 
(one day attack). Furthermore, samples of the results of both experiments are shown in Appendix 
C and Appendix D.  
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Figure 6.1: Destination Location Frequencies of CAIV Dataset of Legitimate users 
 
Figure 6.2: Destination Location Frequencies of CAIV Dataset of Illegitimate Users 
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6.3 Threshold Selection 
Threshold selection is a crucial factor in any system. In order to find the optimum threshold value 
which is trade of False Negative Rate (FNR) and False Positive Rate (FPR). It is required to find 
the FNR, FPR, sensitivity, specificity and accuracy of each threshold to decide the proper one, 
which calculated these rates based on the two experiments. The next sections are illustrating the 
process of choosing the threshold value.  
6.3.1 Experiment 1 
The first experiment was run on the CAIV simulator for a legitimate user. The legitimate user 
experiment runs over the daily calendar events of a user with random location access for free time 
events and a commitment to attend any available calendar event of users; it is assumed that all the 
activities are coming from a legitimate user. The result data were stored in the local database of 
the machine. We examined the stored data of the experiment with different thresholds to find the 
False Negatives (FN) and True Positives (TP). The results were stored in tuples in the database, as 
shown in Figure 6.3 below; the logStatus field in the experiment database result represented 
whether the system was successful in verifying the user’s identity or not. In this experiment, the 
failed status is regarded as a FN and a success status is regarded as a TP (De Luca et al., 2012). 
Appendix E showing the source code of the legitimate user experiment.  
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Figure 6.3: History Log Table 
The experiment total login attempts were 632 attempts for one working day, since the number of 
subjects is 79 and there are eight time-slots for each business day. The next experiment has the 
same number of attempts. These two instances(FN, TP) are used later to find the accuracy, FNR 
and FPR.  
6.3.2  Experiment 2 
The second experiment was runs on the CAIV simulator for an illegitimate user to find the True 
Negatives (TN) and False Positives (TP). An illegitimate user experiment runs over the random 
locations access for all calendar daily events; it is assumed that all activities are coming from 
intruders (illegitimate users). The attack scenario assumed that the attacker has a user ID (RFID 
card which is used as user identifier in the system) and they intend to use it within the system’s 
domain. For every attempt (attack), the simulator assigns a random location from the environment 
locations (35 locations) to test the system’s robustness against the attack.  
The experiment results are stored in the local database of the machine. The table structure is similar 
to the HistoryLog table in Figure 6.3 above but stored in different table in the database. The 
logStatus field of the experiment database represented whether the system had succeeded in 
verifying the user’s identity or not. In this experiment, the failed status regarded as a True Negative 
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(TN) and a success status is regarded as a False Positive (FP) (De Luca et al., 2012). These two 
instances are used later to find the accuracy, FNR and FPR.  
6.3.3 Confusion Matrix  
Given a classifier and an instance, there are four possible outcomes. If the instance is positive and 
it is classified as positive, it is counted as a True Positive (TP); if the instance is classified as 
negative and it is positive, it is counted as a False Negative(FN). If the instance is negative and it 
is classified as negative, it is counted as a True Negative(TN); if the instance is classified as 
positive and it is negative, it is counted as a False Positive(FP). The set of instances (the test set) 
can be represented by a two-by-two confusion matrix (also called a contingency table) as shown 
below in Table 6-1 (Marsland, 2015). 
Table 6-1: Confusion Matrix and Common Performance Metrics 
Legitimate User Illegitimate User 
True  
Positives 
False  
Positives  
False  
Negatives 
True  
Negatives 
P N 
 
6.3.4 False Negative Rate and False Positive Rate  
The two equations below are used to find the FNR and FPR(Marsland, 2015). Equation 6-1 
presents the formula to calculate the False Negative Rate (FNR). It divides the total of  FN cases 
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where the CAIV system mistakenly identifies the legitimate user as an intruder over FN and TP. 
We regard the FNR as the False Rejection Rate (FRR).  
𝐹𝑁𝑅(𝐹𝑅𝑅) =
𝐹𝑁
(𝐹𝑁+𝑇𝑃)
. 100%    Equation 6-1 
 Equation 6-2 is the formula that used to find the False Positive Rate. We regards the FPR as the 
False Acceptance Rate (FAR). It divide the FP where the CAIV system missidentified the intruder 
as a legitimate user over FP and TN cases.  
𝑭𝑷𝑹(𝑭𝑨𝑹) =
𝑭𝑷
(𝑭𝑷+𝑻𝑵)
. 𝟏𝟎𝟎%   Equation 6-2 
After implemented the two experiment, the stored data of the experiments results have a list of 
cases which includes (FNs, TPs, TNs, TPs), which can be used to find the FNR and PPR rates.  
6.3.5 Accuracy  
Accuracy determines the true value, the repeatability or reproducibility of the measurement and 
the proximity of measurement to the precision results. Marsland defined it as “the sum of the 
number of true positives and true negatives divided by the total number of examples”. 
Accuracy =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
(𝐹𝑁+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑃)
     Equation 6-3 (Marsland, 2015) 
To find the optimum threshold, we need to find FAR, FRR, accuracy, sensitivity and specificity. 
Therefore, we need four essential types of classifications (TP, FP, TN and FN) to make the 
calculations for different thresholds. Classifications obtained by running the CAIV simulator based 
on two scenarios to get two experiments for both legitimate and illegitimate users as described in 
experiment 1 and experiment 2. To decide the optimum threshold, the experiments need to be 
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tested against different threshold values. After running the experiment for various thresholds, the 
resulted data can be used to decide the threshold value. The threshold values are [0.1,0. 
12,…,0.98,1.0];  
Table 6-2: FRR and FAR Rates of Different Thresholds 
Threshold FRR FAR Threshold FRR FAR Threshold FRR FAR Threshold FRR FAR 
0.1 0.11 0.07 0.34 0.49 0.01 0.58 0.99 0 0.82 1 0 
0.12 0.17 0.06 0.36 0.98 0.01 0.6 0.99 0 0.84 1 0 
0.14 0.17 0.06 0.38 0.49 0.01 0.62 0.99 0 0.86 1 0 
0.16 0.17 0.06 0.4 0.49 0.01 0.64 0.99 0 0.88 1 0 
0.18 0.17 0.06 0.42 0.49 0.01 0.66 0.99 0 0.9 1 0 
0.2 0.17 0.06 0.44 0.49 0.01 0.68 0.99 0 0.92 1 0 
0.22 0.17 0.06 0.46 0.49 0.01 0.7 0.99 0 0.94 1 0 
0.24 0.17 0.06 0.48 0.49 0.01 0.72 0.99 0 0.96 1 0 
0.26 0.49 0.01 0.5 0.99 0 0.74 0.99 0 0.98 1 0 
0.28 0.49 0.01 0.52 0.99 0 0.76 1 0 1 1 0 
0.3 0.49 0.01 0.54 0.99 0 0.78 1 0    
0.32 0.49 0.01 0.56 0.99 0 0.8 1 0    
 
Figure 6.4 shows the presentation of the FRR values of the different thresholds, while Figure 6.5 
shows the FAR values of the same thresholds. We conclude that the threshold value with 0.5 
enhances the FAR percentage to 0% while get a high percentage of FRR with 99%. Increasing the 
threshold value affects the FAR positively and FRR negatively. However, the threshold value can 
be decided based on the institution (environment) policy.  
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Figure 6.4: FRR Rates of Different Thresholds 
 
 
Figure 6.5: FAR Rates of Different Thresholds 
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To find the sensitivity which is the true positive rate Equation 6-4 is used. And to find the 
specificity which is the true negative rate Equation 6-5 is used.  
SN=TP/P            Equation 6-4: Sensitivity (True Positive Rate) 
SP=TN/N     Equation 6-5: Specificity (True Negative Rate) 
The optimum threshold value is 0.24. As shown in Table 6-3, the number of attacks was 632, only 
44 of them was FP while the number of FN less than the number of FNs of 0.26 threshold value. 
From the observed data, the FP cases divided between the Calendar and User preferences while 
the history log did not record any FP case, Figure 6.6 shows the percentage for each parameter. 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(0.24) =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
(𝐹𝑁+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑃)
 =87% 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(0.26) =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
(𝐹𝑁+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑃)
 = 74% 
 
Table 6-3: The Optimum Threshold Results 
Threshold TP FN TN FP FRR FAR Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
0.26 322 310 622 10 17% 1% 75% 
 
51% 98% 
0.24 521 111 588 44 17% 6% 88% 
 
82% 93% 
 
Figure 6.6 showing the percentage of exploiting the intruder for each parameter, when the CAIV 
misidentified the identity of the user. It shows that the calendar and preferences are sharing the 
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percentage with 60% of the Calendar and 40% of the Preferences. While the history did not exploit 
by the intruder with 0%. The Ambient Object excluded since the attack scenario assumed that the 
intruder has only the RFID card of the user.  
 
Figure 6.6: False Positive Cases of Illegitimate User Experiment, 0.4 Threshold Value  
 
Figure 6.7: TP, FN, TN and FP of Different Thresholds 
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Figure 6.7 shows that the FP cases are very low at 0.26-0.48 thresholds. While TP dropdown to 
zero at 0.5 threshold. FNs increased exponentially until 0.5 threshold, after that still at the same 
level, while TN has a stable performance over the different thresholds.  
6.4 Results  
After running the experiment with the optimum threshold, 0.24, the result of sensitivity, specificity 
and accuracy values are as follows: 82%, 93% and 88%, respectively. The findings show that the 
CAIV model can identify and verify a user’s identity in a pervasive environment with a high level 
of precision. Appendix F showing the results of these three rates of different thresholds.  
Moreover, the performance of CAIV can be enhanced in the future by reviewing and refining 
CAIV inference rules. The maintenance of these rules is achievable because the history log of any 
misidentified identity is stored in the history log database; the experts can retrieve it for auditing 
purposes.  
Table 6-3 above shows the accuracy percentages of the FRR and FAR of the optimum threshold, 
0.24. Since, selecting the threshold value is a trade-off between FAR, FRR and accuracy, the 0.26 
threshold value can be selected as well. However, we get less accuracy and sensitivity rate and 
quite high number of FN, yet the FPs are only 10 cases.  
6.5 Summary  
CAIV is a context-based model which employs four context parameters to verify user identity in 
a pervasive environment. The CAIV method can ascertain the identity of the user in this 
environment based on the available context (different combinations of context parameters). These 
parameters go through a fuzzy inference system, which includes a set of rules. These rules have 
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been discussed with experts and presented and refined to become 81 rules. We perform an 
evaluation test by using two experiments; one for legitimate users and the other for illegitimate 
users. The results in Table 6-3 above shows that the CAIV method is reliable enough to be 
considered as a standalone verification method of user identity in the pervasive computing 
environment. Moreover, due to the CAIV design which is illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, CAIV 
can integrate with some information systems in the pervasive environment to facilitate the 
verification process (no further credentials required, less intrusive) and improve the security of the 
system while preserving the user’s privacy at the same time. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 
In this research, an unobtrusive method is proposed to verify a user’s identity in a pervasive 
computing environment based on four context parameters. This chapter includes the study’s 
conclusion along with future work discussion, presented in the following sections.  
7.1 Conclusion  
The pervasive computing environment includes a variety of services, devices and secure 
locations which are restricted to use by legitimate users. Using pervasive computing environment 
facilities requires occasional verification of users’ identities. Traditional authentication methods 
(HAK) are quite distracting for the user and need more effort (time, cost) to deploy them. Since 
these methods were not designed for the pervasive environment, the need has emerged for a new 
verification method tailored to this environment. This method needs to be less intrusive to the user 
and capable of verifying a user’s identity at the same time. The CAIV method is well placed to 
solve this issue. It provides a seamless verification service for user identity in the pervasive 
computing environment which is the main objective of this research. 
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We presented the most important scenarios to evaluate the proposed method and depict the 
system’s functionalities. Briefly, an RFID card is used to identify the user in the pervasive 
environment. Consequently, the CAIV module can identify the user based on the available context, 
the CAIV aggregates the available context and sends these data to the CAIV reasoning engine. The 
CAIV reasoning engine is a fuzzy rule based model; it processes these data to produce a trust value. 
The trust value is compared against the threshold value to enable the system to decide whether the 
user satisfies a certain level of trust. Then the system declares the user as a legitimate user if they 
reach that level of trust; otherwise, the user is either rejected and declared as an illegitimate user 
or the system requests more credentials to verify the user’s identity.  
A fuzzy rule based model is used in the CAIV method to infer a user’s identity. It uses a set of 
rules which were discussed with experts and it was decided to use 81 rules. The fuzzy logic is 
selected to overcome data shortages, learning delay and cloning the expert experience into the 
CAIV model. This cloning brings the expertise of the security expert into the CAIV method and 
makes the system behave like an experienced security person.  
The essential principles of the proposed system are to infer a user’s identity based on the available 
context. That context is classified based on the existence of activity. This activity is divided into 
two parts: location and time. Then, the activity classification is mapped into each parameter of the 
four CAIV parameters. Eventually, the decision (classification) makes the decision of experts 
about the parameters’ significance easier.  
To implement, analyse and test the CAIV system behaviour against different scenarios which face 
the system and the users every day, we did two experiments by using the CAIV simulator that were 
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conducted to monitor and collect synthetic data about a potential user's behaviours. Finally, a CAIV 
prototype was developed to give users the experience of using the CAIV model in real-life.  
The two experiments above were conducted in a discrete event simulator (CAIV simulator) which 
we developed to find a suitable environment for the CAIV method to be tested. The simulation 
results of those two experiments helped to select the proper threshold value and show the behaviour 
of the CAIV method with various scenarios.  
The CAIV prototype indicates that our approach is achievable and deployable. It provides evidence 
of how the CAIV terminal will perform in a real system environment. It gives a chance to the user 
to use the system not only by relying on simulator results but to try it in a real environment.  
The threshold value has been chosen based on the balance between the FAR and FRR. The selected 
value can be changed according to the policy in the deployed environment (organisation, 
university, institute, etc).  
Results show that the new method tackles the issues faced by traditional verification methods and 
previous work. The result shows that the CAIV method successfully achieved the research aim and 
objectives. CAIV nominated four context parameters of pervasive computing to verify user’s 
identity by relying on the literature review. We developed the framework based on these 
parameters, tests and evaluates that framework by using the designated simulator. It overcome the 
learning process time of other approaches, such as machine learning by relying on fuzzy logic; the 
fuzzy logic rules is maitainable and easy to understand by expert. The results shows that the CAIV 
method is achieved  88% of accuracy of verifiying user identity in the pervasive computing 
envrinment.    
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7.2 Future work  
The CAIV method maintains four parameters. The main goal of the research is to prove the concept 
thoroughly. This concept claims the ability to use multi-context parameters to verify a user’s 
identity. Consequently, there are some assumptions and limitations that can overcome them in the 
future such as extending the history parameter dependency from location only to time and location 
together. Other extensions are expanding the ambient object weight to include multi-objects rather 
than picking up an object with the highest weight and deploying the CAIV prototype in a real 
environment, by getting real data that will help to maintain the CAIV design to enhance the CAIV 
performance. Finally, from the real data, we can calculate the weight of an event’s components 
(time and location) for each parameter.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
CAIV Inference Engine Rules 
3- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
4- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
5- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
6- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
7- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
8- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
9- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
10- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
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11- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
12- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
13- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
14- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
15- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium) 
16- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
17- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
18- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
19- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
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20- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
21- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
22- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
23- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
24- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
25- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
26- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
27- if (Calendar is Low) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
28- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
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29- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
30- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
31- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
32- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
33- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
34- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
35- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
36- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
37- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
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38- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
39- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
40- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium Low) 
41- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
42- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
43- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
44- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
45- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
46- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
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47- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
48- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
49- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
50- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
51- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
52- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
53- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
54- if (Calendar is Medium) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
55- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
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56- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium) 
57- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is High) Then (Trust is High) 
58- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
59- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
60- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
61- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
62- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
63- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Low) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
64- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
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65- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
66- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Low) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
67- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
68- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
69- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
70- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
71- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
72- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is Medium) and (User Preferences is High) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is High) 
73- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
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74- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
75- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Low) and (Ambient 
Object is High) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
76- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium) 
77- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is Medium) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
78- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is Medium) and 
(Ambient Object is High) Then (Trust is High) 
79- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is Low) Then (Trust is Medium High) 
80- if (Calendar is High) and (History Log is High) and (User Preferences is High) and (Ambient 
Object is Medium) Then (Trust is High) 
  
 151 
 
Appendix B 
CAIV Prototype on Raspberry Pi 3 Code Sample  
from array import * 
import mysql.connector 
import datetime 
import bluetooth 
import MFRC522 
import signal 
import RPi.GPIO as GPIO   
from time import sleep 
import time 
from output import * 
ble=[] 
GPIO.setmode(GPIO.BOARD) 
password=[0,0,0,0] 
#initial values and constants  
timenowsend="" 
# RFID location can be changed to test the CAIV decision  
rfid_location=28 
# Enterance time tolerance (in minutes) 
time_tolerance=55 
# The assumed date ( it can be vary to test the system's flexibility ) 
sdate=datetime.datetime(2015, 5, 4) 
# User ID 
usid=2 
# Trust Threshold Value 
threshold=0.4 
# Ambient Objects Value 
global amb 
amb=0.0 
###################################################################### 
#### Searching in the Fuzzy Inference Engine (inside the output.py)### 
###################################################################### 
def search (a,b,c,d): 
 if b>0.9: 
     b=0.9 
 for i in range(0,len(ruls_heap)): 
    temp=ruls_heap[i] 
    if temp[0]==a and  temp[1]==b and  temp[2]==c and  temp[3]==d: 
        return temp[4] 
        break; 
############################ Begin Table _ Preferences #################### 
def view_preferences(uid,location): 
    t=0.0    
conn=mysql.connector.connect(user='root',password='root',host='localhost',dat
abase='uc') 
    cursor=conn.cursor() 
    # location     probability percentage 
    query = ("SELECT c.LocationlocationID,c.probabilityRatio FROM 
UserPreferences c WHERE UseruserID="+str(uid)+" AND 
LocationlocationID="+str(location)+"; ") 
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    cursor.execute(query) 
    tmp=[] 
    for row in cursor.fetchall() : 
        if row[1]>0: 
            t=row[1] 
        else: 
            t=0.0 
    conn.close() 
    return(t) 
########################### Begin_Calendar_Table_View###################### 
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Appendix C 
Sample Data of Legitimate User History log on 1-7-2016 of Experiment 1 
 
ID logStatus logTime Weights trust_value P_Location Location User ID 
1 Success 00:01:00 2090 0.25 0 0 1 
2 Success 00:02:00 0090 0.25 0 32 1 
3 Success 00:03:00 0090 0.25 32 31 1 
4 Success 00:04:00 9060 0.5 31 30 1 
5 Failed 00:05:00 0010 0.0875525 30 30 1 
6 Success 00:06:00 0060 0.5 30 27 1 
7 Failed 00:07:00 2010 0.102964 27 5 1 
8 Success 00:08:00 9060 0.5 27 27 1 
9 Success 00:01:00 0060 0.5 0 27 2 
10 Success 00:02:00 5090 0.25 27 9 2 
11 Success 00:03:00 9090 0.5 9 16 2 
12 Success 00:04:00 0098 0.75 16 34 2 
13 Success 00:05:00 0090 0.25 34 35 2 
14 Success 00:06:00 9090 0.5 35 0 2 
15 Success 00:07:00 9090 0.5 0 8 2 
16 Success 00:08:00 9090 0.5 8 3 2 
17 Success 00:01:00 5090 0.25 0 30 3 
18 Success 00:02:00 9090 0.5 30 12 3 
19 Success 00:03:00 0098 0.75 12 24 3 
20 Success 00:04:00 2090 0.25 24 31 3 
21 Success 00:05:00 0090 0.25 31 27 3 
22 Success 00:06:00 5090 0.25 27 17 3 
23 Success 00:07:00 0090 0.25 17 27 3 
24 Failed 00:08:00 2010 0.102964 27 32 3 
25 Success 00:01:00 5010 0.25 0 32 4 
26 Success 00:02:00 0067 0.5 32 25 4 
27 Success 00:03:00 0090 0.25 25 28 4 
28 Success 00:04:00 5010 0.25 28 12 4 
29 Success 00:05:00 5010 0.25 12 6 4 
30 Failed 00:06:00 0010 0.0875525 6 28 4 
31 Failed 00:07:00 0010 0.0875525 6 32 4 
32 Failed 00:08:00 2010 0.102964 6 32 4 
33 Success 00:01:00 0090 0.25 0 31 5 
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34 Success 00:02:00 5060 0.5 31 27 5 
35 Success 00:03:00 5060 0.5 27 0 5 
36 Success 00:04:00 0060 0.5 0 28 5 
37 Success 00:05:00 5060 0.5 28 20 5 
38 Success 00:06:00 0090 0.25 20 33 5 
39 Success 00:07:00 5060 0.5 33 4 5 
40 Success 00:08:00 0060 0.5 4 35 5 
41 Failed 00:01:00 0010 0.0875525 0 27 6 
42 Success 00:02:00 0066 0.5 0 34 6 
43 Success 00:03:00 5060 0.5 34 4 6 
44 Success 00:04:00 9060 0.5 4 29 6 
45 Success 00:05:00 5010 0.25 29 12 6 
46 Success 00:06:00 5060 0.5 12 32 6 
47 Success 00:07:00 0060 0.5 32 27 6 
48 Success 00:08:00 5010 0.25 27 27 6 
49 Success 00:01:00 0060 0.5 0 28 7 
50 Success 00:02:00 5060 0.5 28 7 7 
51 Failed 00:03:00 0010 0.0875525 7 26 7 
52 Failed 00:04:00 2010 0.102964 7 18 7 
53 Success 00:05:00 2090 0.25 7 4 7 
54 Failed 00:06:00 0010 0.0875525 4 26 7 
55 Success 00:07:00 0090 0.25 4 34 7 
56 Failed 00:08:00 0010 0.0875525 34 33 7 
57 Success 00:01:00 5090 0.25 0 27 8 
58 Success 00:02:00 5010 0.25 27 21 8 
59 Success 00:03:00 0090 0.25 21 30 8 
60 Success 00:04:00 0090 0.25 30 28 8 
61 Success 00:05:00 2090 0.25 28 29 8 
62 Success 00:06:00 9010 0.5 29 11 8 
63 Failed 00:07:00 0010 0.0875525 11 28 8 
64 Success 00:08:00 5090 0.25 11 28 8 
65 Success 00:01:00 2060 0.5 0 29 9 
66 Success 00:02:00 0019 0.25 29 34 9 
67 Success 00:03:00 0090 0.25 34 33 9 
68 Success 00:04:00 9090 0.5 33 27 9 
69 Success 00:05:00 5060 0.5 27 13 9 
70 Success 00:06:00 9060 0.5 13 17 9 
71 Success 00:07:00 5060 0.5 17 8 9 
72 Success 00:08:00 0060 0.5 8 24 9 
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73 Success 00:01:00 0060 0.5 0 29 10 
74 Success 00:02:00 2090 0.25 29 9 10 
75 Success 00:03:00 2090 0.25 9 5 10 
76 Success 00:04:00 9060 0.5 5 6 10 
77 Success 00:05:00 0090 0.25 6 28 10 
78 Success 00:06:00 9060 0.5 28 28 10 
79 Success 00:07:00 5060 0.5 28 14 10 
80 Success 00:08:00 0090 0.25 14 35 10 
81 Success 00:01:00 9010 0.5 0 30 11 
82 Success 00:02:00 5010 0.25 30 10 11 
83 Success 00:03:00 0060 0.5 10 29 11 
84 Success 00:04:00 5010 0.25 29 19 11 
85 Success 00:05:00 9060 0.5 19 31 11 
86 Success 00:06:00 9060 0.5 31 29 11 
87 Failed 00:07:00 0010 0.0875525 29 31 11 
88 Success 00:08:00 0060 0.5 29 33 11 
89 Success 00:01:00 5010 0.25 0 30 12 
90 Success 00:02:00 0066 0.5 30 25 12 
91 Success 00:03:00 9060 0.5 25 7 12 
92 Success 00:04:00 0060 0.5 7 28 12 
93 Success 00:05:00 2060 0.5 28 9 12 
94 Success 00:06:00 0060 0.5 9 32 12 
95 Success 00:07:00 9060 0.5 32 19 12 
96 Success 00:08:00 0060 0.5 19 35 12 
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Appendix D 
Sample Data of Illegitimate User History log on 1-7-2016 of Experiment 2 
 
ID logStatus logTime Weights trust_value P_Location Location User ID 
1 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 35 1 
2 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 0 2 1 
3 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 0 32 1 
4 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 0 8 1 
5 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 0 1 1 
6 Failed 00:06:00 0000 0.08 0 11 1 
7 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 0 16 1 
8 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 0 18 1 
9 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 33 2 
10 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 0 13 2 
11 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 0 35 2 
12 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 0 20 2 
13 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 0 16 2 
14 Success 00:06:00 0009 0.25 0 23 2 
15 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 23 11 2 
16 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 23 32 2 
17 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 12 3 
18 Success 00:02:00 9000 0.5 0 12 3 
19 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 12 29 3 
20 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 12 28 3 
21 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 12 11 3 
22 Failed 00:06:00 0000 0.08 12 14 3 
23 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 12 35 3 
24 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 12 13 3 
25 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 6 4 
26 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 0 13 4 
27 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 0 11 4 
28 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 0 7 4 
29 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 0 2 4 
30 Success 00:06:00 0007 0.25 0 25 4 
31 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 25 12 4 
32 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 25 14 4 
33 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 19 5 
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34 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 0 21 5 
35 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 0 12 5 
36 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 0 23 5 
37 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 0 23 5 
38 Failed 00:06:00 0000 0.08 0 8 5 
39 Success 00:07:00 0007 0.25 0 25 5 
40 Failed 00:08:00 0005 0.0875525 25 34 5 
41 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 21 6 
42 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 0 7 6 
43 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 0 28 6 
44 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 0 28 6 
45 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 0 15 6 
46 Failed 00:06:00 0000 0.08 0 3 6 
47 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 0 11 6 
48 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 0 30 6 
49 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 14 7 
50 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 0 9 7 
51 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 0 33 7 
52 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 0 28 7 
53 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 0 7 7 
54 Success 00:06:00 0007 0.25 0 25 7 
55 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 25 31 7 
56 Failed 00:08:00 0005 0.0875525 25 23 7 
57 Success 00:01:00 0008 0.25 0 25 8 
58 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 25 17 8 
59 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 25 14 8 
60 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 25 34 8 
61 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 25 6 8 
62 Failed 00:06:00 0000 0.08 25 35 8 
63 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 25 13 8 
64 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 25 14 8 
65 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 5 9 
66 Success 00:02:00 0009 0.25 0 23 9 
67 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 23 4 9 
68 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 23 14 9 
69 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 23 5 9 
70 Success 00:06:00 0009 0.25 23 23 9 
71 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 23 19 9 
72 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 23 21 9 
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73 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 4 10 
74 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 0 4 10 
75 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 0 18 10 
76 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 0 12 10 
77 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 0 21 10 
78 Failed 00:06:00 0000 0.08 0 1 10 
79 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 0 11 10 
80 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 0 29 10 
81 Success 00:01:00 9000 0.5 0 30 11 
82 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 30 3 11 
83 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 30 1 11 
84 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 30 1 11 
85 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 30 24 11 
86 Failed 00:06:00 0000 0.08 30 10 11 
87 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 30 26 11 
88 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 30 21 11 
89 Failed 00:01:00 0000 0.08 0 21 12 
90 Failed 00:02:00 0000 0.08 0 4 12 
91 Failed 00:03:00 0000 0.08 0 3 12 
92 Failed 00:04:00 0000 0.08 0 16 12 
93 Failed 00:05:00 0000 0.08 0 17 12 
94 Failed 00:06:00 0000 0.08 0 7 12 
95 Failed 00:07:00 0000 0.08 0 27 12 
96 Failed 00:08:00 0000 0.08 0 34 12 
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Appendix E 
Experiment 1 Simulator - Python Source Code 
 
 
import mysql.connector 
import datetime 
from array import * 
import random 
from output import * 
############################# Markov Chain Function ######################### 
number_of_attack=0 
decision=0 
previsitedlocation=0 
def fetch_location_pairs(id,x,y): 
  location_rate = 
[[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]] 
conn=mysql.connector.connect(user='root',password='root',host='localhost',dat
abase='uc') 
  cursor=conn.cursor() 
  # Title    Time     Date     Location      [[TaskTime(1,23) iCalendar 
Type]] 
  query = ("SELECT h.Previsited_location,h.LocationlocationID FROM 
HistoryLog3imposter h WHERE logStatus='Success' AND UseruserID="+str(id)+" 
ORDER BY Previsited_location,LocationlocationID;") 
  cursor.execute(query) 
  tmp=[] 
  for row in cursor.fetchall() : 
      tmp.append ([row[0],row[1]]) 
  conn.close() 
  for i in range (0,len(tmp)): 
      location_rate[tmp[i][0]][tmp[i][1]]+=1 
  return(location_rate) 
#### Searching in the Fuzzy Inference Engine (inside the output.py)### 
def search (a,b,c,d): 
 if b>0.9: 
     b=0.9 
 for i in range(0,len(ruls_heap)): 
    temp=ruls_heap[i] 
    if temp[0]==a and  temp[1]==b and  temp[2]==c and  temp[3]==d: 
        return temp[4] 
        break; 
############## Adds a tuple to the history log ####################### 
def 
add_log(status,j,day,parameters_mrg,trustval,credential,previsited_location,d
esiredLocation,userid): 
    
conn=mysql.connector.connect(user='root',password='root',host='localhost',dat
abase='uc') 
    my_cursor=conn.cursor() 
    #Add only the success location as a previsited location 
    if status=="Success": 
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    previsitedlocation= desiredLocation 
    add_historylog ="INSERT INTO HistoryLog3imposter 
(logStatus,logDate,logTime,parameters4,trust_val,moreCredential,Previsited_lo
cation,LocationlocationID, UseruserID) VALUES (%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s)" 
    tim=j+1 
    tim='00:0'+str(tim)+':00' 
    dat='2016-07-'+str(day+1) 
    global previsitedlocation 
    #print (trustval) 
    
my_cursor.execute(add_historylog,(status,dat,tim,parameters_mrg,trustval,cred
ential,previsited_location,desiredLocation,userid)) 
    conn.commit() 
timetemp_today_cal=array('i',[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) 
timenowsend="" 
desiredLocation=0 
##########################Trust_Algorithm################################## 
def check_context(contx,current_time,timetemp_today_cal): 
    t_flag=0 
    if contx : 
        for i in range(0,len(timetemp_today_cal)): 
            #print(timetemp_today_cal[i]) 
            if timetemp_today_cal[i]==contx: 
                if current_time==(i+1): 
                    t_flag=1 
    if t_flag==1: 
        return (1) 
    else: 
        return (0) 
##########################Trust_Algorithm################################## 
##########################Initial Trust Value############################## 
trust=0 
############################## Begin Table _ View ######################### 
def view_table(sdate,ididi): 
    
conn=mysql.connector.connect(user='root',password='root',host='localhost',dat
abase='uc') 
    cursor=conn.cursor() 
    # Title    Time     Date     Location      [[TaskTime(1,23) iCalendar 
Type]] 
    query = ("SELECT c.Title,c.Time,c.Date, c.LocationlocationID, c.taskTime 
FROM Calendar3 c WHERE Date ='"+sdate+"' AND UseruserID="+str(ididi)+"; ") 
    cursor.execute(query) 
    tmp=[] 
    for row in cursor.fetchall() : 
        tmp.append ([row[0],row[1],row[2],row[3],row[4]]) 
    conn.close() 
    return(tmp) 
############################ End Table View ############################### 
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############################## Begin Table _ Preferences ################## 
def view_preferences(uid): 
    
conn=mysql.connector.connect(user='root',password='root',host='localhost',dat
abase='uc') 
    cursor=conn.cursor() 
    # location     probability percentage 
    query = ("SELECT c.LocationlocationID,c.probabilityRatio FROM 
UserPreferences c WHERE UseruserID="+str(uid)+"; ") 
    cursor.execute(query) 
    tmp=[] 
    for row in cursor.fetchall() : 
        tmp.append ([row[0],row[1]]) 
    conn.close() 
    return(tmp) 
############################## End Table Preferences ##################### 
############################## Begin Table _ AmbientObjects ############## 
def view_AmbientObjects(uid): 
    tmp2=[] 
    
conn=mysql.connector.connect(user='root',password='root',host='localhost',dat
abase='uc') 
    cursor=conn.cursor() 
    query1 = ("select a.aoDescription,a.aoType,a.aoGeneralID from 
AmbientObjects a where UseruserID="+str(uid)+"; ") 
    cursor.execute(query1) 
    for row in cursor.fetchall() : 
        tmp2.append ([row[0],row[1],row[2]]) 
    conn.close() 
    return(tmp2) 
############################ End Table View ############################### 
 
######################### convert ######################################### 
############************ Background Map Fucntion ************############## 
########### Reduce number of characters of Event########################### 
def convert_txt(x): 
    output=str(x) 
    output=output[:8] 
    text22 = font.render(output, True, black) 
    return (text22) 
######################## convert ent ##################################### 
def date_convert(x): 
    date_tmp=str(x) 
    return date_tmp[:10] 
####################################################################### 
 ################### Starting The Main Iterations###################### 
####################################################################### 
for ididi in range (1,80): 
 var=0 
 sdate=datetime.datetime(2016, 7, 1) 
 #vt=view_table(date_convert(sdate),ididi) 
 #print("Date: ",date_tmp[:10]) 
 my_row=[] 
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 xm=0 
 for day in range(0,1): 
    #vt=view_table(date_tmp[:10],ididi) 
    my_row.append(view_table(date_convert(sdate),ididi)) 
    sdate +=datetime.timedelta(days=1) 
    #print("+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++"+"/n") 
    #print("+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++"+"/n") 
    #print(my_row[xm]) 
    xm=xm+1 
    #print (vt[0],vt[1],vt[2],vt[3],vt[4],vt[5],vt[6],vt[7],"H"+"/n") 
    ##!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!# 
    #////////////////////////Threshold Value//////////////////////////////# 
    ##!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!# 
    threshold_value=0.24 
 #This list contains all history log of the user with ID = x 
 history=[] 
 tot=0 
 previsitedlocation=0 
 htrust=0.0 
 for day in range(0,1): 
    my_row.append(view_table(date_convert(sdate),ididi))     
    sdate +=datetime.timedelta(days=1) 
    if my_row[day]: 
        # Hour counter, initial value 
        hr_local=1 
        for j in range(0,8): 
        #Print(my_row[day][j][1])   time, can be zero for name, and 3 for 
date 
        #Title    Time     Date     Location      [[TaskTime(1,23) iCalendar 
Type]] 
        #Print("@@@@@@@@@@",hr_local,"+++++++++",desiredLocation) 
        desiredLocation=random.randint(1,35) 
                #ctrust input value of calendar 
                ctrust=0 
    ######################################################## 
    ############ Parameter (1) = (Calendar) ################ 
    ######################################################## 
                #if my_row[day][j][2].day == my_row and 
my_row[day][j][3]==desiredLocation: 
                if my_row[day][j][3]==desiredLocation: 
            # set high value to ctrust 
                    if my_row[day][j][4]==1 : 
                        ctrust=0.9 
            # set medium value to ctrust 
                    elif my_row[day][j][4]==2 : 
                        ctrust=0.5 
            # set low value to ctrust 
                    elif my_row[day][j][4]==3 : 
                        ctrust=0.2 
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    ######################################################## 
    ############ Parameter (2) = (User Preferences)######### 
    ######################################################## 
            # Secondly, Check the preferences and find the input value 
                prf=view_preferences(ididi) 
                #ptrust input value of preferences 
                ptrust=0 
                for k in range(0,len(prf)): 
                    if prf[k][0]== desiredLocation : 
                        ptrust=prf[k][1] 
    ######################################################## 
    ############ Parameter (3) = (Ambient Objects)########## 
    ######################################################## 
          # Thirdly, Check ambient objects which will assign one   
  object randomly. 
                atrust=0 
                #1 
                ao= view_AmbientObjects(ididi) 
                #print(ao) 
                #2 
                if len(ao)>2: 
                    #ao_in=random.sample(range(len(ao)), 2) 
                    valrnd=random.randint(0,len(ao)-1) 
                    #print valrnd 
                    ao_in=ao[valrnd] 
                else: 
                    ao_in=ao[0][0] 
                #ao_in=ao 
                #3 
                #print ("&&&&",ao_in[1]) 
                for ki in range(0,len(ao_in)): 
                    #print ("Hello",ao_in[0][1]) 
                    if ao_in[1] == 1: 
                        if atrust<0.9 : atrust=0.9 
                    elif  ao_in[1]==2: 
                        if atrust<0.1 : atrust=0.1 
                    elif ao_in[1]==3: 
                        if atrust<0.6 : atrust=0.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 164 
 
 
    ######################################################## 
    ############ Parameter (4) = (History Log) ############# 
    ######################################################## 
                    total_history_weight=0 
                
xarray=fetch_location_pairs(ididi,previsitedlocation,desiredLocation) 
                #print 
("Previsited_Location,",previsitedlocation,desiredLocation,xarray[previsitedl
ocation][desiredLocation]) 
                if xarray[previsitedlocation][desiredLocation]>0 : 
                  for i in range (0,36):                   
total_history_weight=total_history_weight+xarray[previsitedlocation][i] 
             #print ("Total weight",total_history_weight) 
                     #print 
(xarray[previsitedlocation][desiredLocation],total_history_weight) 
                  if total_history_weight!=0:                      
htrust=float(xarray[previsitedlocation][desiredLocation])/float(total_history
_weight) 
                      #print ("History 
Trust",float(xarray[previsitedlocation][desiredLocation]),float(total_history
_weight),htrust) 
                  else: 
                      htrust=0 
                else: 
                   htrust=0 
 
    ######################################################### 
    ################## Rounding the parameters weights ###### 
    ##################  to be stored in the DB         ###### 
    ######################################################### 
    ###////////////////// 
 
                parameters_mrg="" 
                cal_input=round(ctrust,1) 
                his_input=round(htrust,1) 
                amb_input=round(atrust,1) 
                prf_input=round(ptrust,1) 
                b1=str(cal_input) 
                b2=str(his_input) 
                b3=str(amb_input) 
                b4=str(prf_input) 
                parameters_mrg=b1[2]+b2[2]+b3[2]+b4[2] 
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    ######################################################### 
    ################## Check the threshold value ############ 
    ##################+ The Attack Can Be Adjusted +######### 
    ######################################################### 
    ###////////////////// 
                #print (parameters_mrg)  
 
                random_passcode_value=random.randint(1,10) 
                #*********************** 
                # ******30% attack****** 
                #*********************** 
        # It is disabled now 
                if random_passcode_value>11: 
                     # add new tuple to the history table 
                     trustval=search(0,0,0,0) 
                     if trustval>=threshold_value: 
                         
add_log('Success0',j,day,parameters_mrg,trustval,1,previsitedlocation,desired
Location,ididi) 
                         decision=1 
                     else: 
                         
add_log('Failed1',j,day,parameters_mrg,trustval,1,previsitedlocation,desiredL
ocation,ididi) 
                         decision=0 
 
                else: 
                    # add new tuple to the history table with faild status 
                    trustval=search(cal_input,his_input,0.0,prf_input) 
            if trustval==null: 
             trustval=0; 
                    if trustval>=threshold_value: 
                         
add_log('Success',j,day,parameters_mrg,trustval,1,pre
visitedlocation,desiredLocation,ididi) 
                    else: 
                               
add_log('Failed',j,day,parameters_mrg,trustval,1,prev
isitedlocation,desiredLocation,ididi) 
                         decision=0 
 
      # Instance tracing of the four parameters, trust value, and the status  
         
print(round(ctrust,1),round(ptrust,1),round(atrust,1)
,round(htrust,1),"*+-+-+-+-*/n",trustval,decision) 
 
                # Set value to the output variable(status) 
                #print ("e") 
                hr_local = hr_local+1 
      ####\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\*** 
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Appendix F 
 Accuracy, Specificity and Sensitivity of Different Thresholds 
 
Threshold TP FN TN FP Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
0.1 558 74 586 46 0.91 0.88 0.93 
0.12 521 111 588 44 0.88 0.82 0.93 
0.14 521 111 588 44 0.88 0.82 0.93 
0.16 521 111 588 44 0.88 0.82 0.93 
0.18 521 111 588 44 0.88 0.82 0.93 
0.2 521 111 588 44 0.88 0.82 0.93 
0.22 521 111 588 44 0.88 0.82 0.93 
0.24 521 111 588 44 0.88 0.82 0.93 
0.26 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.28 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.3 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.32 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.34 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.36 10 622 622 10 0.50 0.02 0.98 
0.38 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.4 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.42 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.44 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.46 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.48 322 310 622 10 0.75 0.51 0.98 
0.5 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.52 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.54 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.56 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.58 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.6 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.62 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.64 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.66 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.68 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.7 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.72 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
0.74 6 626 632 0 0.50 0.01 1.00 
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0.76 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.78 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.8 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.82 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.84 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.86 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.88 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.9 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.92 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.94 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.96 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
0.98 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1 0 632 632 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
